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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, Alexander Vasquez was convicted of participating in a 
drug conspiracy and was sentenced to serve twenty years in prison.1  
Error infected his trial:  the trial court improperly allowed the jury to 
use against Vasquez recorded conversations between Vasquez’s code-
fendant, Joel Perez, and Perez’s wife, Marina.  The jury heard Marina 
tell her husband that Vasquez’s attorney had suggested that Perez 
could enter a plea and receive a better sentence but should do so 
 
 1 United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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without implicating Vasquez.2  Despite this error, Vasquez did not re-
ceive a new trial.  Dividing 2-1, a panel of the Seventh Circuit applied 
the harmless error doctrine and allowed the conviction to stand.  The 
division demonstrates that the court’s approach as it applies the doc-
trine will determine the outcome.  The majority focused only on the 
evidence that supported the conviction and concluded that the pros-
ecution evidence was strong enough that the error was harmless.3  
The dissent instead focused on the role of the erroneously admitted 
evidence as well as weaknesses in the government’s case.4  The dis-
senting judge pointed out that the erroneously admitted evidence 
was highly prejudicial (playing a dramatic role in the end of the trial 
and undermining the credibility of Vasquez’s attorney who then had 
to argue to the jury on his behalf) and that the government empha-
sized this evidence. 5  The dissent also noted that the jury acquitted 
Vasquez of one of two charges, reading this as a sign of the weakness 
of the case.6 
Existing Supreme Court precedent does not clearly endorse one 
approach over the other, and the Vasquez case offered the Court the 
opportunity to provide guidance.  Unfortunately, the Court bypassed 
that opportunity.  Having issued a writ of certiorari, the Court dis-
missed the writ as improvidently granted after hearing argument in 
the case.7 
The Court’s dismissal of the writ in Vasquez has broad implica-
tions.  Harm assessment tests are central to criminal procedure.  A 
number of tests that determine whether a criminal defendant is enti-
tled to relief require courts to assess the harm caused by a particular 
error or shortcoming.8  If the court does not find the requisite degree 
of harm, the court will deny the defendant relief even though trial er-
 
 2 Id. at 897.  
 3 Id. at 898.  
 4 Id. at 902–04. 
 5 Id. at 903.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532, 1532 (2012). 
 8 The harmless error doctrine is first among the harm assessment tests, frequently invoked 
by courts to uphold convictions despite clearly established error.  United States v. Pallais, 
921 F.2d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 1990) (commenting that “[t]he expansive code of constitu-
tional criminal procedure that the Supreme Court has created in the name of the Consti-
tution is like the grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive harmless error rule in 
most cases prevents a criminal defendant from obtaining any benefit from the code”); Ja-
son M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm:  How Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless 
Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2005) (noting that the “significance 
of the doctrine has grown”); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Ef-
fect of Evidence:  Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. 
REV. 1147 (1983) (discussing some tests that require assessment of harm). 
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ror, attorney incompetence, or the suppression of favorable evidence 
may have tainted the process that led to the defendant’s conviction. 
The way in which these tests are defined and applied is critical to 
ensure that a criminal accused receives a fair trial and to enforce the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Unfortunately, the tests are 
not well differentiated and are often applied in a manner that does 
not adequately protect the defendant’s interest in a fair trial.  Each of 
these rules is too often viewed in isolation or in relation to only one 
or two other standards on the spectrum of harm assessment.  They 
are all defined in similar terms, and all should be considered in rela-
tion to each other.  This Article argues that the courts should define 
the harm assessment tests with greater clarity and should ensure that 
they are implemented in a manner that more effectively protects de-
fendants’ right to a fair trial. 
This Article focuses on six harm assessment tests that determine 
whether a defendant will receive relief for an identified flaw in the 
criminal process.  The tests fall into three categories.  First, three of 
the tests apply when the defendant establishes a specific error at trial:  
the plain error test, the harmless error test in instances of non-
constitutional error (Kotteakos test), and the harmless error test in in-
stances of constitutional error (Chapman test).9  Second, two of the 
tests are included in the definition of defendants’ constitutional 
rights and apply when the defendant identifies a failing on the part of 
the prosecution or defense counsel:  if the prosecution fails to dis-
close exculpatory evidence or to correct false testimony, the defend-
ant must show materiality (a harm test) in order to establish a due 
process violation.10  If the defendant alleges a violation of the right to 
counsel through incompetent representation, the defendant must 
show that the incompetence resulted in prejudice to the defendant (a 
harm test).11  Finally, this Article considers motions for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.12  While these motions do not 
 
 9 See infra Part I.B, D.  
 10 See infra Part I.C.  
 11 Throughout the Article, I sometimes refer generically to “error.”  I recognize that a con-
stitutional violation through nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, false testimony, or 
incompetence of counsel is not shown unless the defendant satisfies the materiality or 
prejudice requirement by demonstrating harm.  When discussing those constitutional 
claims, I use “error” as shorthand to refer to the government action (nondisclosure or al-
lowing false testimony to stand uncorrected) or attorney incompetence. 
 12 For ease of terminology, this category will be referred to as motions for new trial under 
Rule 33.  I recognize that motions for a new trial based on constitutional claims are often 
made under Rule 33.  See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 489 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 
2007) (discussing difference in standard).  However, for the purposes of this Article, they 
will be referred to as different categories. 
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arise from an error in the first trial, they reflect the defendant’s claim 
that the first trial was flawed because it was conducted in the absence 
of significant favorable evidence.  These motions require the court to 
assess the significance of the newly discovered evidence to the trial 
and mirror the harm assessment tests. 
Each of these harm assessment tests operates after the prosecution 
has won a conviction.  The tests are crafted to assure the court that 
the conviction resulted from a fair (or fair enough) trial.  Each 
standard reflects the courts’ efforts to balance the interest in the fi-
nality of convictions against the defendant’s interest in the enforce-
ment of specific recognized rights and in receiving a fair trial.  The 
administration of the harm assessment tests determines the value of 
the rules that protect criminal defendants and, further, whether the 
government or the defendant will bear the risk of the problem that 
occurred at trial.13  If the courts adopt a more prosecution-friendly 
 
   In addition, some courts have applied a more defense-friendly standard when the 
new trial motion rests on the discovery that false testimony was presented at trial even 
though the defendant cannot establish a constitutional violation.  The circuits that apply 
a different test demand only that the defendant show that “without the false testimony, 
the jury might have reached a different conclusion.”  I have discussed this issue elsewhere 
and will not focus on it in this Article.  See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Convictions Based 
on Lies:  Defining Due Process Protection, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 331 (2011). 
 13 Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 994 (1973).  If the 
defendant cannot obtain a remedy because the court finds a lack of harm, the right that 
was violated does not protect the defendant. 
   Moreover, each of these inquiries opens an avenue for the appellate court to uphold 
a conviction without necessarily addressing the propriety of the underlying conduct, re-
ducing guidance to other courts and to prosecutors as to what constitutes an error and 
what does not.  See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (holding that 
the Court of Appeals should not have exercised its supervisory authority to address im-
proper prosecutorial comment on the defendants’ silence because it was harmless); see al-
so Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (explaining that a court evaluating 
a claim of ineffective assistance need not analyze both the incompetence prong and the 
prejudice prong, but may resolve the case based on whichever of the two prongs is easier; 
specifically emphasizing that resolving the case based on lack of prejudice would relieve 
the court of having to “grade” counsel’s performance); United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 
126, 131, 138 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that courts need not determine whether attorney 
was incompetent because no prejudice flowed from the specified action); United States v. 
Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 981–82 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the court need not resolve the 
question of error because the alleged error was harmless); United States v. Resendiz-
Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2005) (avoiding question of whether evidence was 
hearsay by concluding admission of challenged evidence was harmless).  See generally 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance:  The Awakening of Cronic’s 
Call to Presume Prejudice From Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 839 (2003) 
(discussing invitation to resolve cases based on lack of prejudice); Richard Klein, The 
Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1466–67 (1999) 
(discussing reliance on prejudice analysis to reject defendants’ claims without addressing 
competence of representation); Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harm-
less:  When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1182–83 (1995) (re-
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test, they increase the likelihood that a conviction infected by error 
will stand.14  If the test is more defense-friendly, a conviction may be 
set aside even though it was not influenced by the trial problem, giv-
ing the defendant a windfall. 
It is important to bear in mind that courts can make mistakes as 
they apply these tests.  Because the prosecution has already won a 
conviction in these cases, the defendant faces the challenge of instil-
ling doubt in the minds of the appellate judges, acting against the 
psychological forces that weigh on the side of affirming the convic-
tion and overcoming a record that favors the government.  The cases 
in which convicted defendants have been exonerated bear witness to 
some of these mistakes.  In 133 of the first 200 cases in which defend-
ants were exonerated by DNA evidence, a court had affirmed the 
conviction with a written explanation.15  Moreover, in almost a third 
of those cases, the court applied the harmless error test and resolved 
it against the defendant, sometimes describing the evidence as “over-
whelming” against the defendant who was later shown to be inno-
cent.16  In addition, both Brady violations and incompetence of coun-
sel have been shown to contribute to the conviction of innocent 
defendants, and yet to get relief a defendant must satisfy a demand-
ing harm assessment test.17 
The courts should redefine the harm assessment tests to achieve 
greater protection of the defendant’s rights, recognizing that some of 
the distinctions employed in discussing harm assessment are too fine 
to be meaningful.  The courts should also provide better guidance 
regarding how to apply the tests.  This Article prescribes an approach 
to achieve these goals.  The Article recommends that courts reduce 
the number of tests, clarify the burden of proof, and recognize that 
the apparent strength of the government’s case should not overcome 
a claim of harm.  Further, the courts should adopt a uniform ap-
proach to applying the tests:  the courts should view the evidence in 
 
marking on the inclination of courts to invoke harmless error to avoid addressing claims 
of error). 
 14 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases:  A Twentieth-Century Per-
spective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459, 465 (2009) (lamenting the move away from federal appel-
late review designed to “correct[] the errors of lower courts and certify[] the quality of 
justice provided”). 
 15 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 95 (2008). 
 16 See id. at 107–08; see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 304 (2006) (citing a case in which 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated that the case was not close, even though defendant 
had a strong alibi, and held that DNA evidence failing to link the defendant to the crime 
was insufficient to warrant a new trial; the defendant was ultimately exonerated). 
 17 See Garrett, supra note 15, at 96. 
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the light most favorable to the defendant, look closely at the role of 
the error and its impact on lay jurors, and limit the degree of defer-
ence to the trial court. 
In Part I, I set out the basic definition of each of the tests.  As stat-
ed, the tests require courts to draw fine distinctions concerning the 
impact of an identified harm on a defendant’s case.  In Part II, I at-
tempt to place the tests on a spectrum based on the courts’ defini-
tions of the tests and also consider the reasons why one test should be 
more demanding than another.  In Part III, I examine the lack of dif-
ferentiation among the tests.  The tests require courts to make appar-
ently impossible distinctions.  The lack of differentiation is com-
pounded by the fact that courts vary the language of the tests, 
blurring the distinctions among them.  As a result, tests that are os-
tensibly different often run together.  In Part IV, I review the way in 
which courts apply the tests, considering the language and reasoning 
they employ as they apply the various tests and the lack of differentia-
tion among the tests.18  In Part V, I suggest methods to clarify the def-
inition and application of these tests to provide stronger protection 
of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE TESTS 
As courts have developed harm assessment tests, they have 
grasped for language that will differentiate among the tests and pro-
vide meaningful guidance to future courts.  This quest has not been 
entirely successful.  Before examining that confusion, however, it is 
critical to try to capture the prevailing definitions.  In this Part, I ex-
amine the basic definition of each test, and in Part II, I show the rela-
tionship among the tests. 
A. New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence (Rule 33) 
The most difficult harm assessment test for the defendant to satis-
fy is the standard under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to win a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in 
 
 18 The discussion in this Article does not claim to touch on every decision that applies one 
of the tests covered; there are too many decisions defining and applying these tests.  In 
order to limit the volume of decisions, the Article does not consider sentencing cases or 
cases in which the conviction rests on a guilty plea.  Further, the Article does not delve in-
to the voluminous state decisions but is limited in scope to federal cases.  Finally, the Ar-
ticle does not examine the special questions of harm assessment that arise in habeas cor-
pus cases. 
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the absence of a constitutional violation.19  To win a new trial, the de-
fendant must convince the court that the newly discovered evidence 
would probably produce an acquittal20 as well as satisfy the other 
 
 19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a) provides: 
Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new 
trial if the interest of justice so requires.  If the case was tried without a jury, the 
court may take additional testimony and enter a new judgment. 
  For ease of terminology, this category will be referred to as motions for new trial under 
Rule 33.  I recognize that motions for a new trial based on constitutional claims are often 
made under Rule 33.  See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 489 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 
2007) (discussing difference in standards, noting that a defendant moving for a new trial 
based on a Brady violation need only satisfy the reasonable probability test rather than 
showing that the evidence would probably result in acquittal).  However, for the purposes 
of this Article, they will be referred to as different categories.  See also LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 24.11(c) at 1198–1200 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing the “exacting 
standards” that apply to a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence). 
 20 See United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated, Mitrione v. Unit-
ed States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005) (gathering decisions from the federal circuits).  See gener-
ally 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 582–84 (4th 
ed. 2011) (discussing the requirements for receiving a new trial).  This probability test is 
sometimes referred to as the Berry test, acknowledging its origin in Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 
511 (Ga. 1851).  In Berry, considering whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence, the court asked whether the new evidence “would 
probably produce a different verdict” and also asked whether the new evidence would be 
“likely to change the verdict which has been rendered.”  See id. at 527–28; WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra, § 584; Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure:  Innocent Prisoners and New-
ly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 667–68 (2005) (discuss-
ing the Berry test). 
   Some courts apply a slightly less demanding test if the new evidence reveals perjury in 
the prosecution case, even though there is no constitutional violation, because the prose-
cutors had no reason to know that the testimony at the first trial was false.  Because this 
represents a minority position, it will not be the focus of the discussion below.  See Poulin, 
Convictions Based on Lies, supra note 12, at 397–99 (discussing standard); WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra, § 585.  Under the test established in Larrison v. United States, the defendant needs to 
demonstrate only that the jury might have reached a more favorable verdict in the ab-
sence of the falsity.  24 F.2d 82, 87–88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. 
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 663–
64 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the “might” test applies in cases of recantation); United 
States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the standard in recanta-
tion cases is whether the jury might have reached a different result without the false tes-
timony); United States v. Lofton, 233 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
“might” test applies to new trial requests based on the discovery that a prosecution witness 
testified falsely at trial); United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413–14 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that motions for new trial should be granted “only with great caution” after the 
identification of perjured testimony); United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178–79 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (applying the Larrison test without expressly adopting it).  See generally Medwed, 
supra, at 668–69 (discussing the test). 
   Concerns with the finality of convictions and the seemingly low hurdle defined by 
Larrison have persuaded many courts to reject the test out of the fear that it would lead 
too often to reversal.  As a result, false testimony cases are usually governed by the prevail-
ing test, requiring the defendant to establish that she would probably be acquitted in a 
new trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2001) 
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three requirements of the Rule:  the evidence must be newly discov-
ered; the failure to discover the evidence at the first trial must not be 
due to a lack of diligence; and ordinarily the evidence must not be 
merely impeaching or cumulative.21  Even if the defendant satisfies 
these requirements, the court has discretion to deny the motion if 
the court is not convinced that the interest of justice requires a new 
trial.22 
B. Plain Error 
Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 
defendant who fails to preserve a claim of error at trial may neverthe-
less obtain relief based on plain error.  The Rule provides that “plain 
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it 
was not brought to the court’s attention.”23  The Court has construed 
the Rule as having several requirements24 and places the burden on 
the defendant to establish those requirements.25 
 
(holding that the same standard applies to claims based on unwitting government use of 
false testimony); United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating 
that the standard is the same in all newly discovered evidence cases and asking whether 
the defendant would probably be acquitted at new trial); United States v. Huddleston, 
194 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1999) (requiring the defendant to establish that she would 
probably be acquitted in a new trial); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245–46 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (rejecting more lenient standard because it would require reversal based on 
perjury even on minor matters); see also Medwed, supra, at 664–65, (discussing emphasis 
on finality); Daniel Wolf, Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie:  The Standard for New Trial in False Tes-
timony Cases, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1925, 1930–33 (1985) (criticizing standard established in 
Larrison). 
 21 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at §§ 583–84. 
 22 See, e.g., United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 171 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that rul-
ing under Rule 33 will be reviewed for abuse of discretion); United States v. Spencer, 4 
F.3d 115, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that the trial court “must exercise ‘great 
caution’ in determining whether to grant a retrial on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence, and may grant the motion only ‘in the most extraordinary circumstances’” and 
that the trial court’s ruling would be reviewed only for abuse of discretion).  The Spencer 
court also noted that the district court’s findings of fact would stand unless they were 
clearly erroneous.  Spencer, 4 F.3d at 119; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 856 (stat-
ing that decisions will be reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
 23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).  Both Rule 52(b), stating the plain error rule, and Rule 52(a), stat-
ing the harmless error requirement for non-constitutional error, use the same “substan-
tial rights” language.  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 24 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 736 (1993) (opining that there must be an 
“error”; it must be “plain” (clear or obvious under current law); it must affect substantial 
rights; and it must so seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judi-
cial proceedings that the court should exercise discretion to correct the error).  See gener-
ally Edwards, supra note 13, at 1183–85 (discussing development of plain error test). 
 25 Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394–95 (1999) (“Where the effect of an alleged error 
is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually af-
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A central requirement is that the defendant must establish harm.  
The defendant must show that the error was “prejudicial:  [i]t must 
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”26  To 
determine prejudice in this context, the Court invokes the reasonable 
probability harm assessment test that defines prejudice in claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and materiality in Brady cases.27 
Under the plain error rule, however, the court is not required to 
grant relief even if the defendant establishes harm, but has discretion 
to do so.28  The court should grant relief only if the error “seriously 
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings,” and relief is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.29  
 
fected his substantial rights.”); Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (holding that defendant has the 
burden of persuasion on the question of prejudice under plain error, whereas the gov-
ernment would have the burden to establish harmless error had the defendant objected); 
United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that defend-
ant bears the burden to establish prejudice in plain error review).  See also United States v. 
Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1579  (11th Cir. 1995) (applying plain error analysis to a claim of 
constitutional error and noting that the Chapman test was modified and the burden of 
persuasion placed on the defendant when the defendant did not object properly at trial). 
 26 Olano, 507 U.S. at 734–36; see also United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 955 (4th Cir. 
2010) (stating requirement); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(stating standard).  In Olano, the Court declined to decide whether the phrase “‘affecting 
substantial rights’ is always synonymous with ‘prejudicial,’” recognizing that some catego-
ries of error may be structural and require reversal without a showing of prejudice.  
Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.  See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 856 (“In most claims of 
plain error, the outcome turns on whether or not prejudice can be demonstrated.”). 
 27 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (stating test).  See also 
United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 142 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that test is reasonable 
probability); Close v. United States, 679 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2012) (pointing out that 
the showing required in plain error analysis to establish that an error affects the defend-
ant’s substantial rights is “virtually identical” to the showing of prejudice required to es-
tablish a constitutional violation as a result of incompetence of counsel); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that test is reasonable 
probability enough to undermine confidence in the outcome). 
 28 The plain error rule is to be employed sparingly, providing relief only “in those circum-
stances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 
(internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985).  See gen-
erally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 856 (explaining the plain error rule). 
 29 See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631–33 (2002) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)) (noting that the error must affect substantial rights and 
must also seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings and holding that error failed to meet that standard); United States v. Harris, 471 
F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) (concluding that the alleged 
error would not have “affected the outcome”); United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 
1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing the role of discretion in plain error review).  See also 
Edwards, supra note 13, at 1190 (noting that courts have construed this requirement as 
requiring reversal only when the error may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent 
defendant); United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that “[t]he main practical difference between [harmless error and plain error] is that 
plain error requires not only an error affecting substantial rights but also a find-
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By allowing a court to correct only particularly egregious errors, the 
plain error rule gives the court the power to avoid an unjust result 
without undermining the requirement that a party enter a timely ob-
jection to preserve error.30 
C. Incompetence of Counsel, Nondisclosure of Exculpatory Evidence, and 
False Testimony 
In defining violations of the Sixth Amendment through incompe-
tence of counsel and violations of the Due Process Clause through 
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence (Brady claims)31 or permitting 
false testimony to stand, the Court has imposed a burden on the de-
fendant to show harm.  To obtain relief on grounds of counsel’s in-
competence, the defendant must show prejudice.32  To establish a 
due process violation, the defendant must show materiality of the 
undisclosed evidence or false testimony.33  If the defendant does not 
meet that burden, there is no constitutional error.34  In most cases, 
the test for prejudice is the same as that for materiality.  The standard 
of materiality is less demanding if the case involves false testimony.35 
1. Prejudice Resulting from Incompetent Counsel and Materiality of 
Exculpatory Evidence 
The Court has defined these constitutional violations as requiring 
the defendant to show harm as an element of the constitutional viola-
tion.  The tests are identical, and courts sometimes use the terms in-
 
ing . . . that the error has ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings’”) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).  See generally WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 20, § 856 (discussing the plain error rule). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Poitra, 
648 F.3d 884, 892 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275–76 (11th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005).  If defense 
counsel’s failure to raise the error at trial was due to incompetence, then the defendant 
may be able to obtain relief by demonstrating that the incompetence resulted in preju-
dice.  The availability of this avenue alleviates the impact of the stringent plain error test. 
 31 The Court first held that nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution was a 
due process violation in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).  As a result, claims 
based on nondisclosure are frequently referred to as Brady claims. 
 32 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating standard). 
 33 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (stating standard). 
 34 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289–90 (1999) (making it clear that the burden of es-
tablishing materiality falls on the defendant). 
 35 See, e.g., Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing difference 
between materiality standard in false testimony cases and that in undisclosed evidence 
cases); United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 577–78 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing different 
standards). 
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terchangeably.36  The defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for the identified problem, the outcome would have been 
more favorable.  The Court defines a reasonable probability as one 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.37 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court defined the two el-
ements necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment based on the incompetence of coun-
sel.38  The mere failure of counsel to represent the defendant 
competently does not violate the defendant’s rights.  Instead, the de-
fendant must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s failings.  To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for the attorney’s failings, the outcome would have been 
more favorable, where a reasonable probability is one sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.39  In Strickler v. Greene, the 
Court explained that the reasonable probability standard was not sat-
isfied even though the defendant had shown that the non-disclosed 
impeachment evidence “might have changed the outcome of the tri-
al;” the reasonable probability test demanded a stronger showing of 
harm.40 
Similarly, the prosecution may violate the defendant’s right to due 
process if it fails to disclose exculpatory evidence.41  To obtain relief 
 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 663 F.3d 726, 735 (4th Cir. 2011); Bucci v. United States, 
662 F.3d 18, 38 n.20 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 37 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (defining test for materiality of non-disclosed exculpatory evi-
dence); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (defining test for prejudice flowing from counsel’s in-
competence).  See generally John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters:  Reasso-
ciating Bagley Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1156–68 (2005) (discussing development of prejudice and materi-
ality tests). 
 38 466 U.S. at 694.  The Court’s standards for determining when attorney incompetence 
violates the Sixth Amendment have been criticized as creating such a high barrier to re-
lief that they fail to protect criminal defendants from the failings of their lawyers.  See Ste-
phen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 516–17 (2009) 
(criticizing the early application of Strickland).  Moreover, the test is structured and ap-
plied in a manner that provides limited guidance as to what constitutes attorney incom-
petence.  Id. at 520. 
 39 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 389 (1986) (dis-
cussing the Strickland standard); United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(applying the Strickland standard); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 627 (noting that Strick-
land defined the burden of proof for a defendant alleging errors by defense counsel); 
Klein, supra note 13, at 1445–46 (discussing standard established in Strickland); Kelly 
Green, Note, “There’s Less in This Than Meets the Eye”:  Why Wiggins Doesn’t Fix Strickland 
and What the Court Should Do Instead, 29 VT. L. REV. 647, 659–68 (2005) (discussing devel-
opment of the prejudice requirement). 
 40 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–90; see Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 
S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 716–18 (2006) (discussing Strickler). 
 41 See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at § 256. 
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on this basis, the defendant must demonstrate not only that the gov-
ernment possessed and failed to turn over evidence that tended to 
exculpate the defendant, but also that the evidence was “material.”42  
The Court adopted the Strickland test to define materiality:  the un-
disclosed evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome would have been different had the evidence been dis-
closed, and a “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”43 
This test reflects the judgment that certain government interests 
outweigh concerns with fairness to the defendant.  In nondisclosure 
cases, the Court applies a government-friendly harm assessment test 
for fear that a rule more favorable to the defendant would effectively 
impose a broad duty of disclosure on the government, an obligation 
that the Court views as too great a burden on the criminal process.44  
The Court has imposed the same requirement for a defendant seek-
ing relief based on the incompetence of defense counsel out of con-
cern that heightened Sixth Amendment protection would lead to in-
terference in the relationship between the defendant and defense 
counsel and would render final judgments unstable.45 
In both categories of cases, the requirement that the defendant 
raise a concern that is “enough to undermine confidence in the out-
come” requires the defendant to raise some level of doubt regarding 
the defendant’s guilt.46  The First Circuit has noted that the defend-
ant may win reversal even if there is “less than an even chance that 
the evidence would produce an acquittal.”47  Nevertheless, given the 
strong pressures on the court to uphold the conviction, this require-
 
 42 Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 678 (stating requirement). 
 43 See id. at 678–82 (citation omitted) (defining standard of materiality by adopting Strick-
land test of prejudice); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82 (discussing the Brady materiality 
standard); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 (1976) (seeking a unified standard 
to replace the diverse standards applied by lower courts, which included standards rang-
ing from evidence that was merely helpful to the defense, to evidence which raised a rea-
sonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 586. 
 44 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.  In Agurs, the Court stated: 
On the other hand, since we have rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor has 
a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, we can-
not consistently treat every nondisclosure as though it were error. . . . Unless every 
nondisclosure is regarded as automatic error, the constitutional standard of mate-
riality must impose a higher burden on the defendant. 
  Id. at 111–12. 
 45 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 46 Id. at 694. 
 47 See Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1216, 1220 (1st Cir. 1993)).  
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ment establishes a daunting barrier to a defendant seeking relief, 
posing an insurmountable burden in many cases.48 
2. Materiality in False Testimony Cases 
The government’s failure to correct false testimony can also vio-
late the defendant’s right to due process.49  The Court applies a more 
defense-friendly harm assessment test for cases in which the govern-
ment permits false testimony to stand uncorrected, reflecting the 
concern that false testimony corrupts the truth finding process of the 
trial.50  False testimony is material “if there is any reasonable likeli-
hood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury.”51 
D. Harmless Error 
Even if the defendant can establish that error infected her trial, 
the conviction will be affirmed if the court concludes that the error 
was harmless.  Federal law mandates harmless error review as a pre-
condition for granting relief to the defendant for non-constitutional 
error.52  In addition, aside from a small number of structural constitu-
tional errors that result in automatic reversal, constitutional errors 
 
 48 See Gershman, supra note 40, at 712–15 (discussing the implementation of the materiality 
standard); Klein, supra note 13, at 1468 (arguing that the standard requires the defend-
ant to prove innocence in order to get relief based on counsel’s incompetence). 
 49 See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 256. 
 50 See United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating “[t]he standard 
of materiality is less stringent, however, when the prosecutor knowingly uses perjured tes-
timony or fails to correct testimony he or she learns to be false”).  See generally Poulin, su-
pra note 12. 
 51 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103–04 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 
(1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681–82; 
United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413–14 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that a new trial 
would not be granted if “the jury probably would have acquitted in the absence of false 
testimony”); Poulin, supra note 12 (criticizing the statement of the basic rule). 
 52 Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not 
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”  In the U.S. Code, harmless error is ex-
plained:  “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall 
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”  28 U.S.C. § 2111.  See generally 
Helen A. Anderson, Revising Harmless Error:  Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals, 17 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 391, 393–96 (2011) (discussing history of harmless error rule); 
Edwards, supra note 13, at 1173–74 (discussing evolution and application of harmless er-
ror rule); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One:  The Early Twentieth-Century 
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (2009) (discussing gen-
esis of harmless error rule). 
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are also subject to harmless error review.53  The harmless error doc-
trine permits courts to conserve resources and avoid pointless retrials 
and, in some cases, permits the court to avoid addressing the merits 
of the defendant’s error argument altogether.54  The applicable harm 
assessment test to determine harmless error depends on whether the 
error was constitutional or non-constitutional.55 
 
 53 See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
79 (1988) (criticizing the Court for failing to articulate a coherent rationale for determin-
ing which constitutional errors are subject to harmless error review and which are not).  
See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 855 (discussing which errors are subject to 
harmless error analysis); Fairfax, supra note 52, at 443–44 (discussing origin of the test 
and Court’s limitation on errors not subject to harmless error review); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 172 (2001) (recognizing that 
courts limit errors that are reversible per se); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1000 (discussing 
genesis of harmless error tests). 
   In some cases, the question of whether there was a constitutional violation is not 
clearly distinguished from the assessment of harmless error.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1988).  In Pirovolos, the court considered and re-
jected the allegation that the prosecution’s rebuttal argument violated due process but 
noted that it collapsed the error and the harmlessness inquiries into the single question 
of whether the defendant received a fair trial.  Id. at 427 n.10.  In rejecting the defend-
ant’s claim, the court noted that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.  Id. at 421; see al-
so David Rossman, Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure:  Alice in Wonderland Meets the 
Constitution, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 432–35 (2009).  Professor Rossman points out that 
in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), the Court held that the defendant’s absence 
from a view held during his trial did not violate his due process rights because the de-
fendant had not shown “a reasonable probability that injustice had been done.”  
Rossman, supra, at 433.  In Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) the Court cited Snyder as a 
harmless error holding, although, as Professor Rossman points out, the case did not turn 
on harmless error.  Instead, the proof of harm was necessary to establish the error.  Pro-
fessor Rossman also points to the discussion in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).  In 
Stincer, the majority held that the defendant had not shown that his exclusion from his 
competency hearing violated due process because he had “failed to establish that his 
presence at the competency hearing would have contributed to the fairness of the pro-
ceeding.”  Id. at 747 n.21.  Justice Marshall complained about the resulting blurred line 
between whether there was a violation and whether it was harmless.  Id. at 754.   
 54 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (emphasizing limitations on errors not 
subject to harmless error analysis); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636–38 (1993) 
(discussing role of harmless error analysis); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 
(1983) (recognizing that harmless error doctrine permits courts to conserve resources); 
see also Edwards, supra note 13, at 1191 (discussing role of doctrine in conserving judicial 
resources); Fairfax, supra note 52, at 447 (stating that harmless error rule was prompted 
primarily by concerns of efficiency and finality). 
 55 See generally Edwards, supra note 13, at 1170–79 (discussing the development of the tests 
and stating that “it is hard to discern any material differences in the two standards”); 
Gregory Mitchell, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:  Constraining Harmless Error Re-
view, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335 (1994) (discussing the Court’s various statements of harmless 
error rules).  In some cases, the parties fail to address the type of error involved.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 n.15 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that the par-
ties had not addressed the issue of which standard applied).  In some instances, it may 
not be clear which test applies.  United States v. Evans, 352 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) 
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1. Non-Constitutional Error:  the Kotteakos Test 
The test for harmlessness of non-constitutional error in federal 
cases, grounded in federal legislation, was established in Kotteakos v. 
United States.56  Kotteakos defined the harm assessment test that is now 
codified in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.57  
Applying this test, the court asks whether the error had a “substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”58  
In addition, although it is sometimes said that both harmless error 
tests place the burden of establishing harmlessness on the govern-
ment,59 the Kotteakos test is sometimes applied with an unclear alloca-
tion of the burden or with the burden falling on the defendant. 
2. Constitutional Error:  The Chapman Test 
The test for harmless error in cases of constitutional error is more 
protective of the defendant and more exacting of the government.  
 
(noting that it is unresolved which test applies to a judge’s ex parte communication with 
the jury); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 172 (criticizing application of the 
more demanding test for constitutional error); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1030 (arguing 
that the test should be the same for all criminal cases, regardless of the type of error). 
 56 328 U.S. 750 (1946); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629–31 (1993) (discuss-
ing origins of test); Solomon, supra note 8 (discussing origins of test); WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 20, § 852 (discussing background of rule). 
 57 Rule 52(a) provides:  “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect sub-
stantial rights must be disregarded.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (stating that “an error involving 
misjoinder ‘affects substantial rights’ and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results 
in actual prejudice because it ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury’s verdict’” (citation omitted)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 122 
(2007) (holding that “[s]ince the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Brecht standard ra-
ther than the Chapman standard, we affirm the judgment below.”); United States v. Pow-
ell, 334 F.3d 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating the two tests); O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 
432, 436 (1995) (holding that “[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave 
doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless. And, the petition-
er must win”); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (“[T]he standard for determining whether habeas 
relief must be granted is whether the Doyle error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Jeffer-
son, 925 F.2d 1242, 1253–55 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing the two tests); United States v. 
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 1988) (setting out the two tests). 
 59 See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (putting the burden on 
the government under both standards); United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1215 
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the burden is on the government to establish harmlessness of 
non-constitutional error). 
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The government must convince the court beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.60 
The harmless error test to be applied in instances of constitutional 
error is derived from Chapman v. California.61 In determining the con-
trolling test, the Court recognized and dismissed the California 
“overwhelming evidence” approach.62  In Chapman, the Court recog-
nized that the defendant, complaining of the error, does not shoul-
der the burden of showing it was harmless.63  Instead, “before a fed-
eral constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”64  
Because of the Court’s clarity, the Chapman test is rarely expressed us-
ing different terminology.65  Dilution of the protection flows from the 
manner in which it has been applied.66 
II. PLACING THE TESTS ON A SPECTRUM 
As noted at the outset, each of these definitions seems more 
straightforward than it proves to be in application.  To determine the 
 
 60 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  See generally Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 
1013–14 (discussing Chapman). 
 61 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 1341–43 (discussing test); Solomon, 
supra note 8, at 1059–60 (discussing test).  Prior to Chapman, in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 
U.S. 85 (1963), the Court applied a harmless error test to the unconstitutional admission 
of illegally seized evidence, asking “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evi-
dence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86–87. 
 62 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (specifically rejecting the reasoning of the California court that 
affirmed the conviction of Chapman’s codefendant).  In People v. Teale, 404 P.2d 209, 220 
(Cal. 1965), the court explained its holding: 
It clearly appears that the error . . . could not have resulted in a miscarriage of jus-
tice as to the defendant Teale.  While he may not have confessed to the crime, 
nevertheless the admissions which he made to his fellow inmate are so damaging 
that, when considered with the other substantial evidence, the proof of his guilt 
must be deemed overwhelming. 
 63 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 64 Id.; United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 n.7 (2004); see Saltzburg, supra 
note 13, at 1012–13 (discussing test). 
 65 But see Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (expressing the test as requiring the 
Court to “determine on the basis of ‘our own reading of the record and on what seems to 
us to have been the probable impact . . . on the minds of an average jury,’” and stating 
further that “unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evi-
dence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required” (citations omitted)); Unit-
ed States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 975–77 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that possible viola-
tion of right to confrontation was harmless because “the not-fully-impeached evidence 
had little or no effect on the reliability of the factfinding process at trial”); Kordenbrock 
v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1111 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“[p]roperly framed, the question is whether the outcome of the trial or conduct of the 
defense would have been different” in the absence of the error). 
 66 See infra, Part V.  See generally Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1015–18 (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s application of standard). 
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effect of the various harm assessment tests, we must consider how 
they relate to each other, locating them on a spectrum.67  Courts that 
have addressed the relationships among some of these tests have not 
generally looked at the full spectrum of harm assessment tests.  Doing 
so reveals the lack of differentiation among these ostensibly different 
tests. 
The hierarchy of harm assessing tests is as follows: 
 Rule 33 and plain error demand more of the defendant than all oth-
er tests 
 The reasonable probability test for materiality and prejudice de-
mands more from the defendant than false testimony materiality 
 The reasonable likelihood test of materiality in false testimony cases 
is the same or more demanding than Kotteakos harmless error 
 A Kotteakos harmless error argument is harder for the defendant to 
overcome than a Chapman harmless error argument 
The harm assessment tests range from more government-friendly 
to more defendant-friendly.  One key variable is the allocation of the 
burden of proof.68  At the government-friendly end of the spectrum 
are the tests that impose the burden on the defendant (Rule 33 new 
trial motions, plain error, materiality, and prejudice).  At the defend-
ant-friendly end of the spectrum are the harmless error tests, which 
place the burden on the government to show lack of harm.  The oth-
 
 67 See Hagos v. People, 288 P.3d 116, 120–22 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (comparing various 
tests). 
 68 In O’Neal v. McAninch, the Court attempted to move away from burden of persuasion lan-
guage.  The Court explained: 
[W]e deliberately phrase the issue in this case in terms of a judge’s grave doubt, 
instead of in terms of “burden of proof.”  The case before us does not involve a 
judge who shifts a “burden” to help control the presentation of evidence at a trial, 
but rather involves a judge who applies a legal standard (harmlessness) to a record 
that the presentation of evidence is no longer likely to affect.  In such a case, we 
think it conceptually clearer for the judge to ask directly, “Do I, the judge, think 
that the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision?” than for the judge to 
try to put the same question in terms of proof burdens (e.g., “Do I believe the party 
has borne its burden of showing . . . ?”). 
  513 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1995).  The Court held that in a habeas case, error is not harmless 
if the judge is in “grave doubt about the likely effect of an error on the jury’s verdict.”  Id. 
at 435.  The Court went on:  “By ‘grave doubt’ we mean that, in the judge’s mind, the 
matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmless-
ness of the error.”  Id.  Even while declaring that allocation of the burden is not useful to 
the inquiry and suggesting that the judge should simply ask “[d]o I . . . think the error 
substantially influences the jury’s decision?,” the Court recognized that in rare cases the 
“record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harm-
lessness.”  Id. at 436–37.  This language describes a failure of proof, precisely the circum-
stance in which the burden of persuasion most clearly comes into play:  that the state has 
failed to meet its burden, resulting in a determination favorable to the defendant.  See 
Edwards, supra note 13, at 1201–02 (discussing O’Neal). 
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er principal variable is the statement of the level of certainly re-
quired, whether of harm or lack of harm. 
It may also be helpful to distinguish the harm assessment tests 
from two more government-friendly approaches.69  First, none of the 
tests on which this Article focuses allow the government to show lack 
of harm merely by demonstrating that the conviction is supported by 
sufficient evidence—the baseline requirement for a constitutionally 
valid conviction.70  In applying the harm assessment tests, a court 
cannot simply ask whether the prosecution introduced enough evi-
dence to uphold the conviction but must assess with particularity the 
role the identified error played in the overall trial.71  Second, none of 
these tests place on the defendant the burden of showing harm by a 
preponderance of the evidence; the burden is less than the prepon-
derance standard.72  Thus, each of these harm-assessing tests is more 
defendant-friendly than either the sufficiency of the evidence test or 
a requirement that the defendant show harm by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
The following discussion places the various harm assessment tests 
in relation to each other.  First, it explains hierarchy of the tests in 
which the defendant bears the burden is as follows. 
 
 69 These tests are also distinct from the most defendant-friendly approach, which requires 
reversal without consideration of harm for errors that are structural or create a presump-
tion of prejudice.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (discussing structural 
errors not subject to harmless error review); LAFAVE, ET AL, supra note 19, §27.6(d).  The-
se errors are not the focus of this Article. 
 70 To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a court merely 
asks whether, viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the government, a reasonable 
jury could have found all the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (setting baseline for constitu-
tionally mandated sufficiency of the evidence).  This test thus sets a low bar and also gives 
the government the benefit of all the inferences. 
 71 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999) (holding that a materiality inquiry in 
case where defendant claims Brady violation does not turn on assessment of sufficiency of 
the evidence); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258–59 (1988) (stating the harmless er-
ror question is “not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the 
death sentence, which we assume it was”); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) 
(harmless error inquiry does not focus on sufficiency of the evidence); Fahy v. Connecti-
cut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963) (noting that the harmless error inquiry is not concerned 
with whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (holding that the “[harmless error] inquiry cannot be merely 
whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the er-
ror.”).  In oral argument in Vasquez, some of the Justices viewed the government’s rational 
jury argument as tantamount to asking for a directed verdict for the government, an un-
sustainable position.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Vasquez v. United States, 132 
S. Ct. 1532 (2012) (No. 11-199). 
 72 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
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A. Rule 33 Is More Government-Friendly Than All the Other Tests.  
The harm assessment test for a Rule 33 motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence is the most demanding of the 
standards, placing the burden on the defendant to show actual prob-
ability of acquittal on retrial as distinct from mere reasonable proba-
bility.73  In Agurs, the Court explicitly stated that the materiality show-
ing in nondisclosure cases was less demanding than the showing 
required by Rule 33 for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence in the absence of government culpability.74  In addition, of 
course, Rule 33 imposes additional requirements on the defendant. 
B. Plain Error Is More Government-Friendly Than All the Harm Assessment 
Tests Other Than Rule 33 Motions.   
In United States v. Dominguez Benitez, the Court explained the dif-
ference between the plain error and harmless error standards:  each 
requires a determination that the error had an effect on substantial 
rights but the plain error test places the burden on the defendant to 
show harm whereas the harmless error test places the burden on the 
government.75  In addition, like Rule 33, the plain error test requires 
the defendant to satisfy additional requirements.76 
 
 73 See United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16, 20–22 (1st Cir. 2001) (differentiating 
between the “actual probability” new trial standard and “reasonable probability” test that 
applies to Brady claims); United States v. Hall, 434 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D. Me. 2006) (“The 
nature of the fourth element (commonly called the ‘prejudice’ requirement) depends on 
the reason for the newly discovered evidence.”); see also United States v. Maldonado-
Rivera, 489 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the standard that applies to new trial 
motion based on Brady violation). 
 74 The Agurs Court stated: 
On the one hand, the fact that such evidence was available to the prosecutor and 
not submitted to the defense places it in a different category than if it had simply 
been discovered from a neutral source after trial.  For that reason the defendant 
should not have to satisfy the severe burden of demonstrating that newly discov-
ered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal. 
  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (citations omitted); see also United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985) (summarizing the Agurs Court holding, which rejected 
the harmless error rule). 
 75 542 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining that the burden is on the government in harmless error 
inquiries and on the defendant when the issue is plain error); see also United States v. 
Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that standards are the same but 
the burden of persuasion shifts).  The Court also addressed the harmless error test that 
applies to collateral review, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.  The Court explained  
that, on collateral review, the government can meet “the more lenient Kotteakos stand-
ard.”  Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81 n.7; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 
(1993) (stating that the “application of the Kotteakos standard on collateral review” will 
not confuse matters for habeas courts). 
 76 See supra Part II.A. 
Apr. 2015] HARM IN CRIMINAL CASES 1011 
 
C. Reasonable Probability Is More Government-Friendly Than Harmless 
Error.   
Because the defendant bears the burden to satisfy the reasonable 
probability test to establish prejudice or materiality, it clearly de-
mands more than the harmless error tests.  Nevertheless, in United 
States v. Dominguez Benitez, the Court stated that the Kotteakos harmless 
error test is similar to the reasonable probability test employed to de-
termine materiality or prejudice.77  Thus, in nondisclosure cases and 
incompetent counsel cases, the standard of materiality or prejudice 
falls somewhere between the Rule 33 test and the test for materiality 
in the false testimony cases, and it is clearly more demanding than 
the test for non-constitutional harmless error.78 
D. Nondisclosure Materiality (Reasonable Probability) Is More Government-
Friendly Than False Testimony Materiality.   
Locating the two materiality standards on the spectrum, the Court 
has made it clear that the reasonable probability materiality showing 
required when the defendant claims that the government committed 
a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence demands 
a higher showing from the defendant than the reasonable likelihood 
 
 77 In Dominguez Benitez, the Court stated: 
In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the 
defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the 
Kotteakos formulation in requiring the showing of “a reasonable probability that, 
but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.” 
  542 U.S. at 81–82 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (adopting the 
prejudice standard applied in cases of incompetent counsel for claims based on the gov-
ernment’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
   The Agurs Court also emphasized that the materiality standard in a nondisclosure 
case is not satisfied whenever the government cannot show lack of harm under the 
Kotteakos test.  Emphasizing the materiality standard, the Court explained: 
It necessarily follows that the judge should not order a new trial every time he is 
unable to characterize a nondisclosure as harmless under the customary harmless-
error standard.  Under that standard when error is present in the record, the re-
viewing judge must set aside the verdict and judgment unless his “conviction is 
sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.” 
  427 U.S. at 111–12 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)). 
 78 The Agurs Court also drew a distinction based on whether the defendant had specifically 
requested the undisclosed exculpatory evidence, but the Court abandoned that distinc-
tion in Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.  See also Hagos v. People, 288 P.3d 116, 119–20 (Colo. 
2012) (explaining that the “reasonable probability” test is more difficult to satisfy than 
the harmless error test for non-constitutional error). 
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standard that applies when the defendant establishes a false testimo-
ny claim.79 
E. False Testimony Materiality Is More Government-Friendly Than the 
Kotteakos Harmless Error Test.   
The Court has stated that the harm assessment standard in false 
testimony cases is close, and possibly identical, to the harmless error 
test.80  The difference lies in the burden of proof.  The defendant 
clearly has the burden to establish the materiality of false testimony 
because materiality is a necessary element of the constitutional viola-
tion.  Under Kotteakos, either the government has the burden to show 
lack of harm or neither party has the burden.81  Either way, the harm 
assessment test in cases of uncorrected false testimony is close to the 
harmless error test but more government-friendly because the bur-
den falls on the defendant. 
F. The Kotteakos Harmless Error Test Is More Government-Friendly Than 
the Chapman Harmless Error Test.   
 The Court has firmly fixed the relationship between the two 
harmless error standards.  The Chapman test for constitutional error 
is more defendant-friendly than the Kotteakos test.  The Chapman 
harmless error test is the only harm assessment test that places a sub-
stantial burden (beyond a reasonable doubt) on the government.82 
 
 79 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112–13; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290–91 (1999) (stating 
that the prosecutor’s closing argument supported the District Court’s conclusion that 
“admittedly undisclosed documents were sufficiently important to establish a violation of 
the Brady rule”). 
 80 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679–80 (“[I]t may as easily be stated as a materiality standard under 
which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it 
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 298–301 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that “‘reasonable likeli-
hood’ [is] synonymous with ‘reasonable possibility’ and thus [ought to] have equated ma-
teriality in the perjured-testimony cases with a showing that suppression of the evidence 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (citation omitted)). 
 81 See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (putting burden on the 
government); United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(placingburden on the government to establish harmlessness of non-constitutional er-
ror).  See also O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S.432, 436– 42 (1995) (discussing allocation of 
burden).  But see United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 153 (6th Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
that burden lies on defendant); United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 503 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(placing burden on defendant). 
 82 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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III. BLURRED LINES 
The courts’ efforts to differentiate among these tests is not entire-
ly successful.  Although it is clear that some harm assessing tests are 
intended to convey a more exacting standard than others, the courts 
do not effectively and consistently articulate or implement those dif-
ferences.  Two problems emerge when one examines these harm as-
sessing tests as requiring a range of harm determinations that fall 
along a spectrum.  First, as discussed in Section A below, the tests ask 
courts to draw impossibly fine distinctions.  Second, as discussed in 
Section B, courts do not employ the terminology consistently, failing 
to adhere to consistent definitions of the tests. 
A. Meaningless Distinctions 
The lack of differentiation among the tests generates confusion 
and may lead courts to equate tests that are intended to be distinct.  
The refined terminology that the Court has developed causes the 
tests to run together.  The Court expects its language to accomplish 
an impossible mission of meaningfully defining differentiated points 
on the spectrum even while recognizing that it does not do so effec-
tively.83 
Writing before the development of the prejudice and materiality 
tests, and discussing only the definition of harmless error, Chief Jus-
tice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court identified the 
problem of articulating a standard that was clear and struck the 
proper balance.84  He identified the following as the only possible 
standards:  more probable than not, reasonably probable, highly 
probable, and almost certain.85  He rejected a test defined in terms of 
reasonable probability out of hand, based in part of the vagueness it 
 
 83 See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (noting that the “difference 
between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight”); 
see also United States v. Peck, 102 F.3d 1319, 1326 (2d Cir. 1996) (Newman, C.J., concur-
ring) (noting the uncertainty present in “most cases” of “whether the reviewing court is to 
consider the effect of the error on the jury or predict what verdict would have been ren-
dered in the absence of the error”). 
 84 ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 34–35 (1970) (discussing appropri-
ate definition of harmless error). 
 85 Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court reached the conclusion that harm-
less error should be assessed by asking whether it is highly probable that the error did not 
have any effect and reversing if that question could not be answered in the affirmative. Id. 
at 35–36; see also Gov’ of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3rd Cir. 1976) (discuss-
ing Chief Justice Traynor’s analysis). 
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would inject.86  Of course, reasonable probability is precisely the harm 
assessing test used to resolve questions of materiality and prejudice. 
Even members of the Supreme Court have noted that the tests are 
too numerous and the distinctions among them impossibly fine.  Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, concurring in Dominguez Benitez, pointed out that 
the Court had adopted at least four different standards—the Chap-
man “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in cases of con-
stitutional error; the Kotteakos “substantial and injurious effect or in-
fluence” standard; the “even less defendant-friendly” reasonable 
probability standard defined in Strickland; and the “still yet less de-
fendant-friendly ‘more likely than not’” standard applied to new trial 
requests based on newly discovered evidence.87  Arguing for a simpler 
scheme, Justice Scalia complained: 
Such ineffable gradations of probability seem to me quite beyond the 
ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp, and thus harmful ra-
ther than helpful to the consistency and rationality of judicial 
decisionmaking.  That is especially so when they are applied to the hy-
pothesizing of events that never in fact occurred.  Such an enterprise is 
not factfinding, but closer to divination.88 
He argued that “[f]or purposes of estimating what would have hap-
pened . . . the only serviceable standards are the traditional ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ and ‘more likely than not.’”89  The adoption of a 
harm assessment scheme based on these familiar burdens is unlikely.  
Only the Chapman test is currently defined in these terms, placing on 
the government the burden of showing constitutional error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The substitution of either of 
these standards for the language used in the other harm assessing 
tests would substantially increase the burden on the party allocated 
that burden, generally the defendant.  Nevertheless, the courts 
should consider Justice Scalia’s principal point:  there are too many 
difficult to grasp distinctions. 
Justice David Souter also commented on the problem of defining 
appropriate harm assessment tests.  In Strickler v. Greene, he com-
mented on the lack of clarity in the definition of materiality.  He 
 
 86 Chief Justice Traynor commented that “[t]he nebulous test of reasonableness is unlikely 
to foster uniformity either in the application of standards, should there be any, or in the 
pragmatic exercise of discretion.”  TRAYNOR, supra note 84, at 34–35. 
 87 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86–87 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted).  Justice Scalia did not recognize the separate and more defendant-
friendly standard that applies to false testimony cases. 
 88 Id.; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 656 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the two standards of harmless error and stating “each requires an exercise of 
judicial judgment that cannot be captured by the naked words of verbal formulae”). 
 89 Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 87 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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complained of “the unfortunate phrasing of the shorthand version 
[of the standard of materiality] in which the standard is customarily 
couched . . . [in particular] the familiar, and perhaps familiarly de-
ceptive formulation:  whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a 
different outcome if the evidence withheld had been disclosed.”90  He 
noted the tension between this statement of the standard and the fact 
that the defendant does not need “to show that a different outcome 
would have been more likely than not with the suppressed evi-
dence.”91  Justice Souter cautioned that “[d]espite our repeated ex-
planation of the shorthand formulation in these words, the contin-
ued use of the term ‘probability’ raises an unjustifiable risk of mis-
misleading courts into treating it as akin to the more demanding 
standard, ‘more likely than not.’”92 
Justice Souter expressed his view on the source of the confusion: 
The circuitous path by which the Court came to adopt “reasonable prob-
ability” of a different result as the rule of Brady materiality suggests sever-
al things.  First, while “reasonable possibility” or “reasonable likelihood,” 
the Kotteakos standard, and “reasonable probability” express distinct levels 
of confidence concerning the hypothetical effects of errors on decision-
makers’ reasoning, the differences among the standards are slight.  Se-
cond, the gap between all three of those formulations and “more likely 
than not” is greater than any differences among them.  Third, because of 
that larger gap, it is misleading in Brady cases to use the term “probabil-
ity,” which is naturally read as the cognate of “probably” and thus con-
fused with “more likely than not.”93 
Justice Souter further suggested that “significant possibility” would 
better express the standard that the defendant must satisfy in nondis-
closure cases.94 
B. Non-Standard Use of Terms 
Substantial confusion also pervades these tests because of the way 
in which courts discuss and apply them.  Cases purporting to apply 
the same test sometimes articulate the test differently.95  Even small 
 
 90 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 297 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 297–98. 
 93 Id. at 300 (citations omitted). 
 94 Id. at 298. 
 95 See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 1351–52 (discussing different definitions of and approaches 
to the harmless error test in instances of constitutional error and describing harmless er-
ror doctrine as being “in a state of confusion”); see also United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42 
(1st Cir. 2006).  In Hall, the court failed to distinguish among the standards.  The court 
merely stated that it was “persuaded the disputed information, if known to [the defend-
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shifts in language may ultimately impact the application of harm as-
sessing tests, and they certainly blur the lines between the tests.  
When courts are confused, the defendant may be deprived of protec-
tion. 
Even the Supreme Court sometimes blurs the distinctions be-
tween tests by equating tests that are actually different.  In Dominguez 
Benitez, the Court equated the “reasonable likelihood” test to the 
“reasonable probability” test.96  The Court also implied that the 
standard for materiality in false testimony cases is the same as the 
standard in nondisclosure cases and that it is identical to the Kotteakos 
harmless error test.97  In addition, the Court acknowledged the con-
fusion of the lower courts:  “This [reasonable probability] standard is 
similar to one already applied by some Courts of Appeals, though 
those courts have not drawn a direct connection to Strickland and Bag-
ley, and in some cases understood themselves to be reviewing for 
harmless, rather than plain, error.”98  This lack of clarity undermines 
the protection provided by these different sets of rules. 
In some cases, courts simply get the applicable test wrong, re-
phrasing or misstating it.  Sometimes, the court frames a test more 
favorable to the defendant.99  In United States v. Williams, for example, 
 
ant], would not have affected the trial’s outcome.”  Id. at 56.  This conclusion is broad 
enough to encompass all three prejudice tests that apply to new trial motions (the rea-
sonable likelihood test that applies to false testimony cases, the reasonable probability test 
that governs in nondisclosure cases, and the Rule 33 standard). 
 96 Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81–82.  The case focused on the defendant’s challenge to 
his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had failed to comply with Rule 11 when 
taking the defendant’s guilty plea.  The Court applied plain error analysis.  See also Har-
rington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (stating the Strickland standard of prejudice 
as “reasonably likely”). 
 97 Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81–82. 
 98 Id. at 82 n.8.  The Court cited two decisions from the Courts of Appeals:  in United States 
v. Martinez, 289 F.3d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir. 2002), the court applied the plain-error stand-
ard, asking “whether any Rule 11 violations would have likely affected [the defendant’s] 
willingness to plead guilty”; in United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc), on harmless-error review, the court asked “whether the defendant’s 
knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been like-
ly to affect his willingness to plead guilty.” 
 99 See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (reversing because the Se-
cond Circuit had held that the defendant was entitled to relief under the plain error test 
if there was “any possibility, no matter how unlikely that the jury could have convicted [the 
defendant] based exclusively on pre-enacted conduct,” rather than requiring the defend-
ant to satisfy the more demanding test); see also Stephenson v. Wilson, 629 F.3d 732, 737–
38 (7th Cir. 2011) (dissenting from the denial of hearing en banc, three judges stated 
that the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for his [attor-
ney’s] deficient performance,” the outcome of the trial might have been different (rather 
than “would” have been different) and that the defendant “need only show that the like-
lihood of a different outcome was better than negligible”); United States v. Caracappa, 
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the Seventh Circuit stated that the defendant need only establish a 
“reasonable possibility” that the result would have been different but 
for his attorney’s failings.100  In United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, the 
First Circuit equated the Brady “reasonable probability” test with the 
“any reasonable likelihood” test of materiality in cases of knowing use 
of false testimony.101  That assertion of equivalence, which either 
makes the test in nondisclosure cases less demanding or the test in 
false testimony cases more demanding, has been echoed in later First 
Circuit cases citing Gonzalez-Gonzalez.102 
Conversely, in other cases the court’s error cuts against the de-
fendant.103  For example, in United States v. Dickerson, the Eleventh 
Circuit equated the materiality requirement in false testimony cases 
to the higher standard applied to nondisclosure violations that did 
not involve falsity, requiring the defendant to show the likelihood of 
 
614 F.3d 30, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the defendant “did not establish that the out-
come of the trial could have been different” but going on to state a reasonable probability 
standard); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that state courts had 
applied the wrong standard to determine materiality); Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 
778, 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “remote likelihood” does not satisfy Strickland test).  
This blurring of the distinctions and confusing use of language is also evident in state 
court decisions.  See, e.g., Hagos v. People, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (Colo. 2012) (discussing 
confusion and noting that the term “reasonable possibility” was picked up from a decision 
of the Supreme Court).  Examination of state court decisions is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
100 616 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant had not satisfied even this 
favorable version of the test). 
101 258 F.3d 16, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Although the Supreme Court has not described 
whether there is a difference between the ‘reasonable likelihood’ and ‘reasonable proba-
bility’ standards, we believe they are equivalent.”) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 298 (1999) and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTER’L DICTIONARY 1310 (1993)). 
102 See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 489 F.3d 60, 68 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing 
the Gonzalez-Gonzalez holding that standards are identical); United States v. Casas, 425 
F.3d 23, 53 (1st Cir. 2005) (treating standards as interchangeable, and citing Gonzalez-
Gonzalez); United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d 280, 290–91 (D.P.R. 2010) 
(citing Gonzalez-Gonzalez and equating reasonable likelihood and reasonable probability 
standards in false testimony claim); see also Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 
2003).  In Shih Wei Su, the Second Circuit commented on the standard that applies in 
false testimony cases, stating it as equivalent to the harmless error test: 
[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that prejudice is readily shown in such cases, 
and the conviction must be set aside unless there is no “reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” 
  Id. at 126–27 (citations omitted). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 981 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that a defend-
ant must establish materiality by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. 
Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the trial court had applied a 
materiality test that imposed too great a burden on the defendant); United States v. 
McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the trial court applied too de-
manding a standard of prejudice). 
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harm sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.104  In United 
States v. McNair, the Eleventh Circuit again confused the require-
ments, stating: 
“When a government lawyer elicits false testimony that goes to a witness’s 
credibility, we will consider it sufficiently material to warrant a new trial 
only when the estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of the given 
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.”  In other words, 
“[t]he materiality element is satisfied if the false testimony could reason-
ably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to under-
mine confidence in the verdict.”  The false testimony is deemed material 
if there is a reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury.105 
Acting on its understanding of the standard in each of these cases, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the false testimony was not mate-
rial, and the defendant was therefore not entitled to relief.106 
Courts have also varied in their statement of the test for a new trial 
under Rule 33.  Some have framed the test as requiring that the de-
fendant “demonstrate that the new evidence is ‘likely to result in an 
acquittal upon retrial;’”107 others have asked whether the new evi-
dence “will probably result in an acquittal.”108  It has also been stated 
 
104 248 F.3d 1036, 1041–42 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The materiality element is satisfied if the false 
testimony ‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.’”) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 
(1999)); see also Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that materiali-
ty standard in false testimony cases is the same as in nondisclosure cases and concluding 
that defendant had not established that false testimony was material); Ventura v. Attorney 
Gen. of Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing the Florida Supreme 
Court’s application of the wrong standard); Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464 
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court committed error when it required defend-
ant to prove that correction of false testimony “probably would have resulted in acquit-
tal”); Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (rejecting defendant’s false testimony claim 
and failing to differentiate between the materiality standard governing false testimony 
claims and that governing ordinary Brady cases).  In Ex parte Chabot, the court held that 
the harmless error standard required the defendant to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the falsity contributed to the conviction; despite its confusion, the court 
granted the defendant relief.  300 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).  In other cas-
es, however, the court’s misunderstanding of the standard may lead to a negative out-
come for the defendant.  See, e.g., Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 376–77 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1996) (en banc) (treating false testimony in hearing on motion to suppress like 
other false testimony but putting burden on defendant to show harm by a preponder-
ance). 
105 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 
106 Id. at 1211. 
107 United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 2006). 
108 United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States 
v. Carmichael, 269 F. Supp. 2d 588, 598–600 (D.N.J. 2003) (stating that the new evidence 
need only raise a reasonable doubt and granting new trial because “there is a strong pos-
sibility that in light of this evidence at a new trial . . . the jury would acquit the defend-
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that the court should not grant a new trial unless there is “a real con-
cern that an innocent person may have been convicted,”109 or the de-
fendant raises a reasonable doubt as to her guilt.110 
The harmless error test applied to non-constitutional errors also 
suffers from variable language.  In United States v. Colombo, the Second 
Circuit not only quoted Kotteakos, stating that an error may be consid-
ered harmless if “our ‘conviction is sure that the error did not influ-
ence the jury,’” but also quoted Chief Justice Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, asking whether “it is ‘highly probable’ that the 
error did not contribute to the verdict.”111  In United States v. Boros, the 
Seventh Circuit asked “whether, in the mind of the average juror, the 
prosecution’s case would have been significantly less persuasive had 
the improper evidence been excluded,” but then went on to state 
that the court reverses “only if [the] exclusion [of the improperly 
admitted evidence] would have made the jury more likely to acquit 
the defendant.”112  Departing from the statement of the test in 
Kotteakos, these statements appear to shift the test in favor of the 
prosecution. 
Courts also sometimes shift the meaning of the test by interchang-
ing words.  For example, applying the harmless error test in United 
States v. King, the Seventh Circuit first quoted its earlier decision in 
Pirovolos and its use of the term “substantial”: 
 
ant”).  Wright and Welling also state that a defendant will receive a new trial if she satis-
fies the other criteria and “the court thinks there is a reasonable probability of an acquit-
tal.”  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 584. 
109 United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Al-
varez, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“There must be a real concern that an 
innocent person may have been convicted.  It is only when it appears that an injustice has 
been done that there is a need for a new trial in the interest of justice.” (internal quota-
tions omitted)). 
110 Carmichael, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 598–99 (noting that evidence must raise a reasonable 
doubt, but need not establish innocence). 
111 United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Ruf-
fin, 575 F.2d 346, 359 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 
1977)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
earlier decisions stating test as whether it is “highly probable that the error did not con-
tribute to the judgment”). 
112 668 F.3d 901, 910–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1988): 
In a federal criminal trial, an error in admitting evidence will be held harmless 
“[o]nly if ‘we are convinced that ‘the error did not influence the jury, or had but 
very slight effect,’ and can say ‘with fair assurance, after stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the er-
ror.’”  Or, more simply, we will reverse a conviction only if the error may have had 
a “substantial influence” on the outcome of the case.  Based on the record before 
us, we are confident that admission of evidence of Pirovolos’s prior convictions 
had no substantial influence on the jury’s verdict. 
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[T]he next question is whether we can say “with fair assurance, after 
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 
not substantially swayed by the error.”  As we said in Pirovolos, we will re-
verse a conviction only if the error may have had a “substantial influence” 
on the verdict.113 
The court then employed the term “substantial” differently, stating 
that the error was harmless, as in Pirovolos, because the evidence of 
guilt was “substantial and largely uncontroverted, so that the jury’s 
guilty verdict would likely have been the same even without the prej-
udicial information.”114  The court thus picked up the term “substan-
tial,” which was used in Pirovolos to define the level of influence that 
would make the error harmful, and instead used it to describe the 
amount of evidence that would render an error harmless. 
The allocation of the burden of showing harm or harmlessness 
when applying the test in instances of non-constitutional error is also 
a source of confusion.115  In Kotteakos, the Court acknowledged that 
the statute placed the burden to establish harm on the party seeking 
the new trial.116  But the Court declined to fix the burden and stated 
that it would depend on the nature of the error.117  Nevertheless, the 
 
113 897 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 
114 Id. (emphasis added). 
115 See LAFAVE, ET AL, supra note 19, § 27.6(b), at 1322 (“Many state courts have adopted the 
Kotteakos standard for reviewing violations of state statutes and rules.  A few courts have 
favored still another standard . . . .”); see, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 647 
(1993) (White, J., dissenting) (expressing view that Kotteakos test for harmless error places 
the burden on the defendant to establish prejudice); Boros, 668 F.3d at 911 (placing bur-
den on the defendant, and stating that the defendant “has not established that the gov-
ernment’s case would have been significantly less persuasive to the jury” had the evidence 
been excluded); United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (placing 
burden of showing harmless error on the government); United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 
1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that the burden of proof is on the govern-
ment under Kotteakos); Pirovolos, 844 F.2d at 427 (placing burden of showing harm on the 
defendant).  In Boros, the court applied a government-friendly version of the Kotteakos 
test.  Boros, 668 F.3d at 910–11.  The court stated that it would reverse “only if [the] exclu-
sion [of the improperly admitted evidence] would have made the jury more likely to ac-
quit.”  Id. 
116 See Saltzburg, supra note14, at 1007 n.60 (suggesting that Kotteakos settled the question, 
placing the burden on the government). 
117 The Court explained: 
It is also important to note that the purpose of the bill in its final form was stated 
authoritatively to be “to cast upon the party seeking a new trial the burden of 
showing that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his sub-
stantial rights, otherwise they are to be disregarded.”  But that this burden does 
not extend to all errors appears from the statement that immediately follows.  
“The proposed legislation affects only technical errors.  If the error is of such a 
character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant’s substantial rights, the 
burden of sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation, rest upon the 
one who claims under it.” 
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Court’s framing of the test suggests that close cases must be resolved 
in favor of the defendant, implying that the burden is on the gov-
ernment:  if the court entertains grave doubt about the impact, it 
cannot deem the error harmless.118  Some courts explicitly place the 
burden on the government.119  For example, the Seventh Circuit has 
explained that “[e]rrors do not merit reversal when the government 
proves that they are harmless” and further clarified its view of the 
burden of proof by stating that the “basic idea” is that “we must be 
convinced that the jury would have convicted even absent the er-
ror.”120  Other courts, however, place the burden on the defendant.  
For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[a]n error is harmless 
unless one can say, with fair assurance that the error materially af-
fected the defendant’s substantial rights—that the judgment was 
‘substantially swayed’ by the error.”121 
Not surprisingly, trial courts also demonstrate confusion about the 
standards.122  In González-Soberal v. United States, for example, the First 
Circuit noted that the trial court had applied the wrong standard to 
determine prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel case.123  
The trial court had stated that the defendant had to “demonstrate 
that but for the unprofessional error, he would not have been found 
 
  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S 750, 760 (1964) (citations omitted).  The Court fur-
ther set out the congressional intent on the burden:  “[W]hether the burden of establish-
ing that the error affected substantial rights or, conversely, the burden of sustaining the 
verdict shall be imposed, turns on whether the error is ‘technical’ or is such that ‘its natu-
ral effect is to prejudice a litigant’s substantial rights.’”  Id. at 765. 
118 See id. at 764–65 (noting that the court cannot hold error harmless if the error had a sub-
stantial influence or if the court “is left in grave doubt”); see also United States v. Evans, 
352 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating proper standard as “a fair assurance that the ver-
dict was not affected”); United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(stating standard). 
119 See United States v. Connelly, 142 F. App’x 951, 953 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining that the 
burden is on the government to establish no “grave doubt” as to whether error substan-
tially influenced outcome); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 854 (stating that the 
burden is clearly on the prosecution). 
120 United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2007) (considering the harm caused by 
improperly admitting other crime evidence). 
121 United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 153 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing other Sixth Circuit deci-
sions using the same language); see also United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 503 (7th Cir. 
2009) (stating that, ordinarily, the burden is on the defendant to show that “an error af-
fected his substantial rights” by demonstrating prejudice). 
122 See, e.g., White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005).  In White, the trial court generated 
some confusion by appearing to apply a “reasonable possibility” test rather than the “rea-
sonable probability” test in an ineffective assistance of counsel case.  The Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the trial court had not repudiated the standard and had correctly focused 
on whether it lacked confidence in the verdict.  White, 416 F.3d at 733. 
123 244 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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guilty.”124  The First Circuit recognized that the trial court had im-
posed a higher standard than the Strickland reasonable probability 
test.125  In United States v. Brodie, the D.C. Circuit noted that the trial 
court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on a Brady 
violation because “there is no evidence that ‘a new trial could probably 
produce an acquittal.’”126 
United States v. King, a trial court decision from the Eastern District 
of Virginia, illustrates the blurred lines.127  In King, the defendant 
moved for a new trial after a prosecution witness recanted.128  The 
District Court recognized the usual framing of the Rule 33 test (that 
the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal in a new tri-
al).  However, the court then restated the requirement, stating that 
the defendant must “show that the probability of a different result is 
sufficiently strong to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
trial in which the conviction was obtained.”129  This language equated 
the harm requirement to the materiality test in nondisclosure cases, 
and the court supported its statement by citing a decision in which 
the new trial motion was based on a Brady violation.  The court also 
stated that “the newly discovered evidence must be such that, on a 
new trial, there is a significant likelihood that the jury’s verdict would 
be not guilty.”130  Ultimately, the District Court turned to the Larrison 
test, requiring only that “the jury might have reached a different con-
clusion without the false evidence,” because the case involved false 
testimony by a government witness.131 
 
124 Id. (quoting United States v. González-Soberal, Civ. No. 98-1292(JAF), at 4 (D.P.R. Feb. 8, 
1999)). 
125 The First Circuit pointed out:  “This higher standard was considered, and explicitly re-
jected, by the Court in Strickland:  ‘The result of a proceeding can be rendered unrelia-
ble, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.’”  Id. (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984)); see also United States v. Petrillo, 821 
F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (reporting that the trial court blurred the distinction among 
the materiality tests, applying a “reasonable possibility” test in a case where the defendant 
alleged false testimony); United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d 280, 290 
(D.P.R. 2010) (holding that “slightly different standards apply to these two claims, but 
both require the defendant to show some degree of prejudice” (citation omitted)). 
126 524 F.3d 259, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
127 232 F. Supp. 2d 636, 644–46 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing different tests). 
128 Id. at 643. 
129 Id. at 645. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 648–49. 
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IV. APPLYING THE TESTS 
Each of these tests requires the court—generally an appellate 
court—to assess the presence of harm in the defendant’s trial and to 
evaluate whether the alleged errors contributed to the conviction.  If 
the court identifies a sufficient risk that the error harmed the de-
fendant, the court will reverse.132  Each application of a harm assess-
ment test is specific to the facts of the case, so other decisions provide 
limited guidance.133  Nevertheless, if the distinctions among the tests 
have meaning, those distinctions should be reflected in the applica-
tion of the tests.  They are not. 
Instead, application of the harm assessment tests reveals several 
troubling patterns.  First, courts do not appear to have consistent ap-
proaches to the tests, and, even applying identical tests, different 
judges adopt approaches that lead to different results.134  Second, ra-
ther than differentiating among the application of different tests, 
courts adopt the same analysis regardless of the test they are apply-
ing.135  Third, courts adopt approaches to applying all these tests that 
undermine protection of the defendants’ rights and the fairness of 
the criminal process.136 
A sampling of cases applying the different harm assessment tests 
reveals common themes in their analyses.  Courts focus on the 
strength of the government’s case.  They summarily dismiss the im-
pact of impeaching or cumulative information.  They draw pro-
government inferences and also reject or disregard defense theories 
that might sway a jury.  Finally, they defer too readily to the trial 
court’s assessment of harm.  These approaches, which blur the lines 
between the tests, are found in decisions applying each of the tests 
 
132 Generally, the court’s only option is to reverse.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 53, at 164 
(concluding that if the appellate court “decides not to affirm the conviction, the only 
remedy available to it is to reverse the trial court and remand the case for retrial”). 
133 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 854 (noting that “decisions in other cases are of only 
limited value”). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 897–900 (7th Cir. 2011) (demonstrating 
that the majority and the dissent, applying the same test, reached different results); see al-
so Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 302 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (pointing out that even though he applied “the same standard to the 
same record,” he reached a different conclusion); Mitchell, supra note 55, at 1335–37, 
1351 (discussing different definitions of and approaches to the harmless error test in in-
stances of constitutional error and describing harmless error doctrine as  being “in a state 
of confusion”). 
135 See discussion infra pp. 1024–28. 
136 See discussion infra Section IV.  
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and threaten the protection of the defendant’s rights.  Each is dis-
cussed below. 
A. Focusing on the Strength of the Government’s Case 
In applying each of these tests, courts routinely find against de-
fendants because they conclude that the strength of the govern-
ment’s case overcomes any argument that the defendant was harmed.  
This analytical approach will often be the easiest path for the court 
because review is based on a record that led to the defendant’s con-
viction.  The record therefore presents the government’s best evi-
dence and arguments. 
The Supreme Court has sent mixed messages on whether this fo-
cus is appropriate.  On the one hand, the Court has cautioned 
against focusing too heavily on the defendant’s guilt.137  That view is 
consistent with the recognition that questions of credibility and the 
weight of evidence are difficult to gauge from a cold record and also 
recognizes the defendant’s right to trial by jury and the crucial role of 
the jury.138  On the other hand, several of the standards are crafted to 
produce reversal only if the court doubts the accuracy of the convic-
tion, directing the court to grant relief only if the error complained 
of “undermines confidence in the outcome.”139  This encourages the 
reviewing court to focus its assessment on the question of actual guilt 
and, consequently, the strength of the government’s case. 
Regardless of the reason, courts regularly dismiss defendants’ 
claims under each of these tests by stating that the evidence against 
the defendant is “overwhelming” or “compelling.”140  Applying the 
 
137 See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 (1945) (applying the harmless error 
test, the Court stated that it was “not authorized to look at the printed record, resolve 
conflicting evidence, and reach the conclusion that the error was harmless because we 
think the defendant was guilty”); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 465 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s reli-
ance on the conclusion that there was overwhelming evidence to find harmless error). 
138 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 54, at 82 (arguing “many courts have assumed virtually un-
reviewable discretion to evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence” as opposed to 
submitting it to the jury). 
139 See supra Section I.C. 
140 See, e.g., Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 (stating that misjoinder was harmless in light of overwhelm-
ing evidence of guilt); United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 247 (1st Cir. 2012) (reject-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel claim because evidence was overwhelming); United 
States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that even if the defend-
ant succeeded in showing that his attorney’s performance was deficient, his ineffective as-
sistance claim would still fail due to overwhelming evidence of guilt); Thomas v. United 
States, 305 F. App’x. 587, 589 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim and 
implying the evidence of guilt was overwhelming); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 
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Rule 33 new trial standard, courts have rejected defendants’ motions 
because of the strength of the government’s case by referring to it as 
strong, overwhelming, or consisting of substantial evidence.141  Courts 
assessing plain error also emphasize the strength of the government’s 
case and deny relief on the ground that the evidence against the de-
fendant is overwhelming.142 
 
219 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding error harmless because evidence “overwhelmingly estab-
lished” guilt and also referring to evidence as compelling); United States v. Boyd, 435 
F.3d 316, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding error harmless because evidence was overwhelm-
ing); United States v. Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding error harmless 
because evidence was overwhelming); Kiley v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 2d 248, 270 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (stating that the defendant could not prevail in his Brady claims because the 
evidence against him was overwhelming); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 
(1993) (concluding error was harmless and noting that the evidence of guilt “was, if not 
overwhelming, certainly weighty”).  One commentator has argued that the courts apply 
overwhelming evidence assessment in a number of different ways.  See Mitchell, supra note 
55, at 1359.  Mitchell criticizes the reliance on overwhelming evidence to establish lack of 
harm and argues that courts apply this approach in at least five different ways: 
“Overwhelming evidence” is a vague standard that has been interpreted by courts 
and commentators in a variety of ways, including:  (a) so much untainted evidence 
“that the jury would necessarily find the defendant guilty” on that evidence alone; 
(b) so much untainted evidence that “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that if 
the jury had never [been exposed to the error] its verdict would have been the 
same;” (c) so much untainted evidence that the average jury “would not have 
found the State’s case significantly less persuasive” absent the error; (d) so much 
untainted evidence that the court “can say, with fair assurance . . . the judgment 
was not substantially swayed by the error;” and (e) so much untainted evidence 
that “there is no substantial possibility that the result would have been any differ-
ent.” 
  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 951 (4th Cir. 2010) (referring to the 
evidence on some of the counts as “overwhelming”); United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 
54 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because 
there was “strong evidence” of the defendant’s criminal involvement); United States v. 
Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[p]ersuasive independent evi-
dence . . . supported the defendant’s conviction” and also commenting that there was 
“overwhelming testimony” from a number of witnesses); see also United States v. Ramos-
Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d 280, 290 (D.P.R. 2010) (stating that prejudice prong is difficult 
to satisfy “where there is a substantial amount of other evidence supporting” the defend-
ant’s conviction).  In some instances, courts assert that mere sufficiency of the evidence is 
enough to defeat the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Saada, 
212 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2000). 
142 See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002) (upholding conviction because 
even if error affected substantial rights, the evidence was uncontroverted and overwhelm-
ing); United States v. Carrasco, 540 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding admission of cer-
tain confessions after previously ruling them inadmissible was not harmless error); Unit-
ed States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that any possible 
violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination did not consti-
tute plain error); see also United States v. Littrell, 439 F.3d 875, 883 (8th Cir. 2006) (quot-
ing an Eighth Circuit opinion stating that an “improper argument is less likely to have af-
fected the verdict . . . when the evidence is overwhelming than in a case where the 
evidence is weak” but also stating that “ample evidence” supported the challenged find-
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Courts rejecting ineffective assistance, nondisclosure, and false 
testimony claims also rely on the strength of the government’s case, 
characterizing the evidence against the defendant as overwhelming 
or compelling.143  Some courts apply even a lower standard, rejecting 
claims on the basis that there were “ample grounds on which the jury 
could have convicted [the defendant]”144 or that there was “substan-
tial evidence.”145  In Gonzalez-Gonzalez, where the defendant sought re-
lief because the government had not corrected false testimony, the 
First Circuit held that the testimony was not material, pointing to “the 
sheer volume of evidence” of the defendant’s guilt, asserting, “[t]his 
was not a close case,” and noting that “ample evidence supports the 
jury’s verdict.”146 
 
ing (citation omitted)); United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 2002) (revers-
ing for plain error where evidence was “not overwhelming”); United States v. Tellier, 83 
F.3d 578, 581 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing for plain error where there was not legally suffi-
cient evidence against the defendant in absence of the erroneously admitted evidence); 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 856 (“Clearly one purpose of the plain error rule is to 
protect the defendant.  If a serious injustice was done it should be remedied.  For this 
purpose courts have consistently recognized that the strength or weakness of the evidence 
is relevant.”) 
143 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984), the Court noted that a “weakly sup-
ported” verdict was more likely to be affected by counsel’s incompetence “than one with 
overwhelming record support.”  The courts implementing these rules often rely on the 
strength of the government case.  See, e.g., United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 951 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (concluding incompetence was not prejudicial because evidence on the issue 
affected was “substantial”); United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 126, 138 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that arguably erroneous admission of evidence which counsel did not pre-
vent did not prejudice the defendant because, even without that evidence, there was 
“substantial evidence” of guilt); United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(asserting that defendant could not establish prejudice because the case against him was 
overwhelming); United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that ver-
dict was supported by “compelling evidence”); United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 
F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (summarizing and commenting on the amount of evidence 
against the defendant); United States v. Frederick, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1160 (D.S.D. 
2011) (stating evidence was substantial); see also United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d 399, 
409 (6th Cir. 2007) (dissenting judge viewed evidence as overwhelming, while the two-
judge majority rejected that characterization). 
144 United States v. Del-Valle, 566 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Ramos-
Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing Del-Valle and holding that mo-
tion for a new trial based on Brady should be denied if there were “ample grounds on 
which the jury could have convicted” the defendant). 
145 United States v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504, 515 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that “there was a sub-
stantial body of evidence” establishing guilt); United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Brady requirements had not been violated because evidence 
was not “material”); see also United States v. Brunshtein, 344 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(stating there was “abundant evidence” on the relevant issue). 
146 Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d at 22–24; see also United States v. Spinelli, 551 F.3d 159, 166 
(2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “ample other evidence supported the conviction”). 
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Even when the courts apply more defendant-friendly harm as-
sessment tests, they are apt to cite the strength of the government’s 
case as a reason to conclude there was no harm.  Indeed, courts also 
appear most comfortable resolving the harmless error question on 
the strength of the government’s case.147  Of course, if the govern-
ment’s case is weak, the error is likely to be harmful.148  More often, 
however, the court concludes that the strength of the government’s 
case mandates a finding of harmlessness.149  Applying harmless error 
tests, courts use the same language as when applying other tests, of-
ten referring to the evidence as “overwhelming” or “compelling” but 
in some cases stating only that the evidence was “ample.”  Even when 
applying the purportedly protective Chapman test, courts look to the 
 
147 See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 (1986) (stating the overwhelming evi-
dence rendered misjoinder harmless); United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 153 (6th Cir. 
2011) (addressing improperly admitted other act evidence and stating that the error is 
harmless “if the other record evidence of guilt is overwhelming, eliminating any fair as-
surance that the conviction is substantially swayed by the error”); United States v. Brown, 
921 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding the trial court’s error was harmless be-
cause of the “very substantial evidence indicating [defendant’s] guilt”); United States v. 
Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasizing strength of government’s case 
as a key factor in assessing harmlessness); see also United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 
123 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing the strength of the government’s case as one of four consider-
ations in determining harmless error); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 854 (stating that 
the strength of government case is single most important factor); Edwards, supra note 13, 
at 1170 (noting tendency of judges to invoke harmless error doctrine to affirm where 
proof of defendant’s guilt is strong); Teitelbaum, et al, supra note 8, at 1187–89 (discuss-
ing the role of the strength of the government’s case in harmless error analysis).  But see 
Miller, 673 F.3d at 701 (stating strength of government’s case is not the “sole relevant fac-
tor”). 
148 See, e.g., Miller, 673 F.3d at 701 (rejecting the government’s argument that the evidence 
was overwhelming and finding harm); Colombo, 909 F.2d at 714 (reaching the conclusion 
that the error was not harmless, the court stressed that the evidence against the defend-
ant “passed the sufficiency-of-the evidence test by a ‘hair’s breadth’”). 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Stubblefield, 643 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that 
admission of other act evidence was harmless and summarizing government’s evidence); 
United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 912 (7th Cir. 2012) (characterizing government evi-
dence as “compelling”); United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (con-
cluding error was harmless because “there was overwhelming evidence”); United States v. 
Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming because there was “ample compe-
tent evidence” supporting conviction); United States v. King, 897 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 
1990) (stating that the evidence of guilt was “more than overwhelming”); United States v. 
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that error was harmless because 
“the evidence against [the defendant]’s self-defense argument was more than overwhelm-
ing”); see also United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 153 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
question of harmlessness generally turns on whether the other evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that 
the evidence against the defendant “was strong, although not overwhelming” but con-
cluding error was harmless); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 854 (stating that “error may 
be more freely disregarded if the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming”). 
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strength of the government’s case and assert overwhelming evidence 
of guilt as a basis for concluding a constitutional error was harm-
less.150 
B. Dismissing Claims as Based on Impeaching or Cumulative Evidence 
Under each of the harm assessment tests, courts also reject de-
fendants’ claims on the ground that the evidence involved was merely 
impeaching or cumulative.  Courts often state that, if new evidence is 
merely impeaching or cumulative, it will not be sufficient to win a 
new trial.151  When considering newly discovered impeachment evi-
 
150 See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 975–77 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
the strength of government’s case rendered error harmless); see also Kordenbrock v. 
Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1112 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing the evidence as overwhelming and viewing evidentiary value of the improperly 
admitted evidence as equivocal). 
   In Chapman, the Court specifically rejected the overwhelming evidence approach, but 
in later cases, the Court framed the test less favorably and invited reliance on the strength 
of the government’s case.  In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), the major-
ity invoked overwhelming evidence reasoning and found the error to be harmless.  The 
dissenting Justices in Harrington argued that, by relying on the strength of the govern-
ment’s case, the decision effectively overruled Chapman.  Id. at 255–56.  The Court’s ac-
ceptance of government arguments based on overwhelming evidence of guilt has made 
the Chapman test more government-friendly in its application than its statement of strong 
protection would suggest.  See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) 
(emphasizing the strength of the government’s case); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 
499, 511–12 (1983) (pointing to “overwhelming evidence” and holding error harmless); 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (pointing to properly admitted “over-
whelming and largely uncontroverted evidence” to support conclusion error was harm-
less); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430–31 (1972) (holding Bruton violation was 
harmless); see also Brent M. Craig, “What Were They Thinking?”—A Proposed Approach to 
Harmless Error Analysis, 8 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 2–12 (2006) (discussing decisions); Mar-
tha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a 
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 21–39 (1976) (concluding that “the cases support the 
propriety of an overwhelming evidence test” but criticizing said test). 
151 See United States v. Mensah, 434 F. App’x. 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting motion 
based on evidence that was cumulative and impeaching); United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 
210, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting motion for new trial because evidence was merely im-
peaching or cumulative); United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (deny-
ing motion for new trial and noting “‘[t]he discovery of new evidence which merely dis-
credits a government witness and does not directly contradict the government’s case 
ordinarily does not justify the grant of a new trial’” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1359 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating rule); United States v. Provost, 921 
F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating rule); see also United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 
240 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding defendant was not entitled to new trial because there was 
“sufficient evidence” to sustain defendant’s conviction); United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 
383, 390–96 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that defendants were not entitled to new trial 
where the new evidence only impeached the witness and did not strongly exculpate the 
defendants).  See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 854.  Only in rare cases will a 
court consider impeachment evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial.  See, e.g., United 
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dence, some courts simply reason that there is sufficient evidence of 
guilt without the testimony of the witness who would be impeached 
by the new evidence.152  Courts also cite the cumulative nature of the 
evidence in harmless error analysis.153 
Courts considering claims of nondisclosure and ineffective assis-
tance also emphasize the fact that evidence was or would have been 
only cumulative or impeaching, therefore concluding that the flaw 
did not generate harm.154  In nondisclosure cases, the Court has held 
 
States v. Jones, 84 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (granting new trial based on infor-
mation that prosecution expert had falsified credentials); United States v. King, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 636, 651 (E.D. Va. 2002) (concluding that even if evidence was viewed as merely 
impeaching, it warranted a new trial); United States v. Kladouris, 739 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (granting new trial based on evidence that impeached key witness). 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Mensah, 434 F. App’x. 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that new 
trial motion may be denied if there is “sufficient independent evidence to sustain a find-
ing of guilt”); United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing 
“the impressive amount of evidence” against the defendant from sources other than the 
impeached witnesses); Saada, 212 F.3d at 217 (noting that evidence was sufficient even 
without the testimony of the witness whose credibility was challenged by the new evi-
dence); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that, even if 
impeached witness’s testimony was disregarded, there was “more than sufficient” evi-
dence to sustain conviction); United States v. Leary, 378 F. Supp. 2d 482, 494 (D. Del. 
2005) (concluding that the defendant could not meet that Rule 33 standard because even 
without the testimony of the witness in question there was sufficient evidence to support 
the conviction).  
153 See, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing whether the 
evidence was cumulative as one of four considerations in determining harmless error); 
United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1063 (8th Cir. 2005) (examining record and 
holding that improper admission of prior statements was harmless, noting that the state-
ments provided only cumulative evidence and did little to support the witness’s credibil-
ity); United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding admission of 
statement taken in violation of Miranda to be harmless in part because the statement du-
plicated an admissible statement by the defendant); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 
45, 62 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that “[t]he inadmissible aspects of [the witness’s] tes-
timony, viewed in relation to the prosecution’s formidable array of admissible evidence, 
was merely corroborative and cumulative”); United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 269 
(4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that any error in excluding certain evidence was rendered 
harmless because the witness was impeached through other testimony); United States v. 
Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the excluded evidence was 
harmless error because no substantial rights of the defendant were affected); see also 
Field, supra note 150, at 41–43 (discussing “cumulative evidence test”). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 592 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that impeach-
ment evidence is not material if the witness’s testimony is “strongly corroborated”); Unit-
ed States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (impeachment evidence not materi-
al because it was cumulative); United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting claim based on failure to impeach in part because the witness’s testimony was 
“merely cumulative”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that undisclosed witness testimony was not material for Brady purposes because it was cu-
mulative of arguments presented at trial); United States v. Emor, 573 F.3d 778, 782 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting Brady claim where the undisclosed interview of the witness would 
have been used only to impeach with prior inconsistent statements, an avenue already 
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that the failure to disclose impeachment evidence may violate due 
process.155  As a result, courts cannot summarily dismiss a claim based 
on the fact that the information is mere impeachment.  Nevertheless, 
they often conclude that the suppressed impeachment evidence is 
not material if the witness was impeached with other evidence at trial 
or if the witness’s testimony was corroborated.156  In Tankleff v. 
Senkowski, for example, the defendant sought relief based on newly 
disclosed impeachment evidence.157  The evidence would have un-
dermined the credibility of both the witness who the defendant ar-
gued had actually committed the double murder with which the de-
fendant was charged and the detective who had not vigorously 
pursued that witness as a suspect.158  The Second Circuit rejected the 
claim, concluding that the newly revealed evidence was merely cumu-
lative impeachment evidence and that both witnesses had been ade-
quately impeached; as a result the additional information would not 
 
pursued at trial); United States v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
there was not a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had evi-
dence been disclosed because it was merely cumulative); United States v. Turner, 501 
F.3d 59, 73 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting Brady claim where undisclosed evidence was merely 
cumulative of “stronger evidence presented at trial”); United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 
55 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s Brady claim because, among other reasons, the 
evidence was cumulative); United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 
2001) (stating that evidence was cumulative); see also Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 
183, 196 (1st Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
state court that erroneously rejected Brady claim had concluded the exculpatory evidence 
was not material by characterizing it as cumulative).  See generally Gershman, supra note 
40, at 718–19 (discussing application of “cumulative evidence” reasoning).  In Conley, alt-
hough the defendant won reversal due to the government’s suppression of impeachment 
evidence, the panel was divided, with one judge dissenting on the grounds that the im-
peachment evidence was cumulative and the witness’s testimony was corroborated.  415 
F.3d at 196. 
155 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1119 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding  sup-
pressed impeachment evidence immaterial); United States v. Spinelli, 551 F.3d 159, 165–
66 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing and rejecting Brady claim based on nondisclosure of im-
peachment evidence); United States v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504, 515 (5th Cir. 2008) (reject-
ing Brady claim even though the non-disclosed evidence would have impeached a key 
government witness); United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 599–600 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that impeachment information was not material because the witness was 
“thoroughly impeached at trial” and her testimony was corroborated); United States v. 
Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Brady claim because there was no rea-
sonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the undisclosed evi-
dence was disclosed at trial); Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 147–48 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (rejecting Brady claim where evidence was impeaching and witness had already 
been impeached). 
157 135 F.3d 235 (2d. 1998). 
158 Id. at 251.  
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have added enough to be material.159  Ultimately, the defendant was 
exonerated and released after serving seventeen years in prison.160  
Had the courts been more receptive to the defendant’s argument, his 
innocence might have been disclosed far sooner.161 
C. Drawing Pro-Government Inferences 
Courts also tend to view the evidence in a light favorable to the 
government.  As a result, they deny relief even though, had the initial 
trial been free of error, the jury might not have drawn the inferences 
essential to conviction in the government’s favor, and, if the case 
were retried, the new jury might not draw those inferences in the 
government’s favor.  This tendency is evident in all the harm assess-
ment tests. 
When evaluating a Rule 33 motion, the trial court can weigh the 
evidence and consider its own opinion of witness credibility.162  Alt-
hough the court need not view the evidence in a light favorable to 
the government, courts do so by deferring to pro-government deter-
minations made by the jury at trial or simply drawing all inferences in 
favor of the government.163 
 
159 Id. at 250–51. 
160 See Charges Dropped Against New York Man, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, (June 30, 2008), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/charges-dropped-against-
new-york-man?searchterm=tankleff.  
161 See also Spinelli, 551 F.3d at 166 (rejecting claim in part because “the evidence of perjury 
would have been cumulative”); United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F. Supp. 2d 280, 
296–97 (D.P.R. 2010) (rejected defendant’s false testimony claim because the evidence 
the defendant brought forward in support of his claim was “cumulative”). 
162 See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 373–75 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing trial court’s 
consideration of credibility in denying motion for new trial); United States v. Brennan, 
326 F.3d 176, 186 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering whether the trial court appropriately al-
lowed a prosecutor to argue for a witness’s credibility); United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 
812, 816 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that trial court appropriately took into account witness’s 
credibility in ruling on new trial motion); United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 119 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (affirming the denial of the new trial motion in part because the district court 
found there was no indication that the trial testimony of the witness impugned by the 
newly discovered evidence was untrue); United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (stating that a trial court has broad discretion to evaluate a witness’s credibil-
ity); United States v. Carmichael, 269 F. Supp. 2d 588, 600 (D.N.J. 2003) (ruling in de-
fendant’s favor in part because the court credited a witness who came forward to excul-
pate the defendant); see also United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138, 148 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (recognizing assessment of credibility as appropriate, but stating that the court 
could not reject magistrate’s assessment that testimony was credible without independent-
ly hearing the witness). 
163 See Brennan, 326 F.3d at 189 (discussing facts at trial in a light favorable to the prosecu-
tion); United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 216–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the jury 
had heard similar evidence and arguments at trial and had not credited them); United 
States v. Yu, 902 F. Supp. 464, 468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that it was “not clear” 
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Similarly, courts applying the plain error test also often view the 
evidence in a light favorable to the government.  In Gonzalez-
Rodriguez, for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
claim that the erroneous admission of evidence was plain error be-
cause there was enough circumstantial evidence from which the jury 
could find guilt.164 
Assessing prejudice caused by incompetent representation or ma-
teriality of nondisclosure, courts are also apt to view the case favora-
bly to the government.  In Strickler v. Greene, for example, the Court 
outlined the various theories that would have allowed the jury to con-
vict the defendant without the discredited testimony, reviewing the 
jury instructions and the evidence in detail.165  It appears that the 
Court gave the government the benefit of the doubt, looking for ways 
to justify the verdict.166  Indeed, when courts dismiss the potential im-
pact of impeachment evidence it is often because they draw infer-
ences favorable to the government, concluding that the jury would 
 
that new evidence would probably lead to acquittal, the court noted that there was 
enough evidence to allow the jury to reach its verdict and stated that “[w]hile the connec-
tion may be tangential and based on inference, the jury found it sufficient”); Hernandez-
Rodriguez, 443 F.3d at 149 (Howard, J., dissenting) (taking the position that defendant’s 
new evidence should be treated with skepticism and pointing to reasons for rejecting the 
credibility of the witness, defendant’s codefendant who had been convicted after denying 
his involvement and post-conviction came forward to exculpate the defendant); United 
States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 951 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating “[w]e know that the jury 
credited much of [the evidence against the defendant]”). 
164 United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2010). 
165 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 292–96. 
166 See id.; see also Close v. United States, 679 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that re-
sponse had counsel objected would have had no effect); United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the govern-
ment and holding that the exculpatory evidence was not material, in part, because the 
witness “had plenty of incentive to stretch the truth in [the defendant]’s favor”); United 
States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that impeachment of an of-
ficer by showing she was under investigation might have been ineffective because the jury 
“could easily have concluded” that she would not aggravate her problems by committing 
perjury); United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 983–84 (10th Cir. 2008) (dividing on ques-
tion of materiality, with majority drawing inferences in favor of the prosecution and the 
dissenting judge positing the way in which the evidence would have supported the de-
fendant’s claim of entrapment); United States v. Hughes, 230 F.3d 815, 820–21 (5th Cir. 
2000) (explaining away exculpatory evidence); Ashley Flynn, Case Note, Strickler v. 
Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999), 12 CAP. DEF. J. 165, 173 (1999) (stating that “the material-
ity determination at the appellate level is rarely favorable to defendant”); Russel D. Fran-
cisco, Comment, Strickler v. Greene:  A Deadly Exercise in Legal Semantics and Judicial Specu-
lation, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 509, 511–12 (2000) (stating that the Court engaged in legal 
semantics to justify the verdict and sentence recommendation). 
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have still believed the prosecution witness and that other impeach-
ment sufficiently attacked the witness’s credibility.167 
Applying the Kotteakos harmless error test, courts also draw pro-
government inferences, often appearing to operate under the influ-
ence of hindsight bias, looking for reasons to uphold the conviction.  
They find error harmless where the jury could convict if it drew the 
necessary inferences in favor of the prosecution.168  In some cases, the 
court expresses this as an opinion that the government presented a 
strong circumstantial case; that opinion rests on the assumption that 
any fact finder would draw inferences favorable to the prosecution 
from the circumstantial evidence.169  Even under the defendant-
friendly Chapman test, courts often draw all inferences in favor of the 
government.170 
 
167 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Torres, 341 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding im-
peachment value would have been “minimal” and noting that defense had “exploited 
other opportunities” to impeach the witness); Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 
140, 147–48 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that defendant had “ample evidence of witness’s 
story changing” in rejecting materiality of evidence withheld); United States v. Hughes, 
230 F.3d 815, 820–21 (5th Cir. 2000) (dismissing impeaching statement as “ambiguous” 
and concluding witness’s testimony was sufficiently tested). 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because the jury 
could have drawn the inference that [the defendant] was a gang member without [the 
improperly admitted “expert”] testimony, the possibility that the jury would use that in-
ference to support a guilty verdict existed even without [the improper] testimony.”); 
United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding error was harm-
less, noting that the jury “could have” interpreted the evidence favorably to the govern-
ment even without the improperly admitted evidence because other witnesses had pro-
vided some of the same information); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1221 (2d Cir. 
1992) (concluding improperly admitted evidence was harmless in part because “the jury 
could easily infer” the same facts from other properly admitted evidence); see also United 
States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating “we are not required to con-
clude that it could not have had any effect whatever; the error is harmless if we can con-
clude that that testimony was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury consid-
ered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record” (quoting Rea, 958 F.2d at 1220)); 
Edwards, supra note 13, at 1187–88 (quoting Justice Traynor and noting that courts often 
assume the jury drew all inferences in favor of the prosecution). 
169 See, e.g., United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding error harmless 
in light of government’s “strong circumstantial evidence”); United States v. Jefferson, 925 
F.2d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding error harmless because “there was an abun-
dance of evidence, other than [the improperly admitted evidence], from which the jury 
could have” resolved the case against the defendant without considering the possibility 
that the jury would not view the circumstantial evidence favorably to the government). 
170 See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430–31 (1972) (assuming truth of government’s 
evidence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) (pointing to in-
ferences that supported conviction); see also Stacy & Dayton, supra 54, at 128 nn.194–95 
(citing examples of decisions holding error harmless because, drawing all inferences in 
the government’s favor, the jury could have found the defendant guilty). 
1034 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
D. Rejecting the Defense Theory of the Case 
Just as they often view the evidence in a light favorable to the gov-
ernment, courts also tend to dismiss out of hand the defense theory 
advanced to support the argument that the defendant suffered harm.  
For example, considering a motion for a new trial in United States v. 
Garland, the trial court disregarded the fact that the new evidence 
specifically supported the defendant’s claim that he was not guilty of 
fraud because he himself had been defrauded.171  In United States v. 
Montilla-Rivera, the court rejected the defendant’s plain error argu-
ment, noting that the trial court properly rejected the testimony prof-
fered by the defendant’s two codefendants, who had already been 
convicted and sentenced.172  The court stated it was appropriate to re-
ject their testimony because it was “inherently suspect.”173 
Likewise, in assessing prejudice and materiality, courts frequently 
reject the defendant’s theory.174  In United States v. Walker, for exam-
ple, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prosecu-
tion violated Brady by failing to disclose that their witness had been 
found in possession of trace amounts of cocaine.175  The court reject-
ed each of the three ways in which the defense argued the evidence 
was material, showing itself unreceptive to the defense theories.176  In 
United States v. Dumas, the trial court justified its conclusion that evi-
dence was not material by anticipating how the government would 
have responded had the defendant possessed the non-disclosed evi-
dence.177  The trial court also rejected the argument that additional 
non-disclosed evidence warranted relief because it would have sup-
ported the entrapment defense, dismissing the defense as construct-
ed on “a thin reed.”178 
 
171 The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded this decision.  United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 
328, 336 (6th Cir. 1993). 
172 171 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1999). 
173 Id. at 42. 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the 
defendant’s testimony at the hearing on the ineffective assistance claim “made it clear 
that he was not a credible witness” and “made it overwhelmingly clear that his testimony 
at the trial would have proven a disaster” (emphasis removed)); United States v. Severns, 
559 F.3d 274, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2009) (crediting prosecution arson expert and stating that 
the defendant had not provided “a coherent explanation”). 
175 657 F.3d 160, 185–88 (3d Cir. 2011).   
176 Id.; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 258 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (ruling that 
trial court was not even required to hold hearing to determine merits of the defendant’s 
claim because defendant’s claim was “conclusively refuted”); Conley v. United States, 332 
F. Supp. 2d 302, 315–18 (D. Mass. 2004) (rejecting argument that evidence was material). 
177 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000). 
178 Id. at 16–17. 
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Courts assessing harmless error are also apt to dismiss the defense 
theory.179  In United States v. King, for example, the Seventh Circuit 
stated that the evidence that the defendant owned the firearm in 
question was uncontroverted.180  The court disregarded a witness’s 
testimony that he heard the defendant tell police the gun was not 
his.181  Had the jury credited that testimony, it would have acquitted.182 
In United States v. Hasting, the defendants claimed mistaken identi-
ty at trial.183  The Court dismissed the defense evidence as “scanty” 
and discounted the claim of mistaken identity because the defend-
ants “tendered no evidence placing any of them at other places at the 
relevant times.”184  The Court thus conflated a mistaken identity de-
 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 911 (7th Cir. 2012) (characterizing the de-
fense evidence as “scant” and discounting impact of error because the defendant had not 
expressed surprise or concern nor disclaimed involvement in the correspondence with 
his coconspirators that the government introduced at trial); United States v. Wilson, 605 
F.3d 985, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing the defense theory of credibility as “implausi-
ble”); United States v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504, 515 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Brady 
material would not have provided sufficient support for defense); United States v. Jerni-
gan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
judges favoring affirmance rejected the posited use of the favorable evidence to support 
the defense of mistaken identity, adhering to the view that the issue of identity had been 
explored and the defendant had lost); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (stating that the defendant’s theory of defense was “implausible”); United States v. 
Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 325 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting weaknesses in the defense as sup-
port for conclusion that error was harmless); United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 
421–22, 427 (7th Cir. 1988) (characterizing the defense as “preposterous” and stating fur-
ther,“we see little chance that a rational jury would have believed [the defendant]’s story, 
even if the trial were stripped of all error”); see also United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 
982–83 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing the defendant’s claim that he was coerced into 
selling drugs as “deficient as a matter of law”). 
180 897 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 1990). 
181 Id.  
182 See also United States v. Resendiz-Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2005) (look-
ing at the range of possible inferences the jury could have drawn in the absence of the 
arguably improper prosecution evidence and concluding that none would have strongly 
supported the defendant’s defense); United States v. Pinillos-Prieto, 419 F.3d 61, 73 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that it was harmless, if error at all, not to give the defendant’s 
proposed jury instruction because the factual version of events that supported defend-
ant’s argument was “an unlikely scenario, to put it mildly” and “the evidence for the gov-
ernment’s version of events was so much stronger than the evidence for the version of 
events under which an error could have affected the verdict”).  In Resendiz-Patino, the 
court dismissed the possible argument the defendant could have made had the evidence 
shown someone else’s fingerprints were on the battery sheath.  420 F.3d at 1181–82.  Alt-
hough the evidence would not have conclusively established that the defendant was not 
aware that the cocaine was in the battery, the jury might have been more inclined to that 
view had the only fingerprints belonged to someone other than the defendant.  The 
court should have recognized that possibility. 
183 461 U.S. 499, 511 (1983). 
184 Id. at 511–12. 
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fense with an alibi defense, dismissed the indications of possible mis-
taken identity, and held the error harmless.185 
E. Giving Too Much Deference to the Trial Court 
Appellate courts often defer to the trial court on harm-related 
questions.  Some appellate judges accord too much deference to the 
trial court.186  In United States v. Jernigan, for example, even though the 
non-disclosed evidence supported the defendant’s claim of mistaken 
identity, the trial court rejected the Brady claim, and a panel of the 
Ninth Circuit deferred to that determination.187  A majority of the 
court sitting en banc reversed, but even then the dissenting judges 
complained that the majority failed to accord sufficient deference to 
the trial court’s assessment that the evidence would not have swayed 
the jury.188 
In González-Soberal v. United States, the First Circuit remanded the 
case, emphasizing that the trial court was better positioned to assess 
the credibility of the government’s witnesses.189  Instead, the court 
should have recognized the importance of giving the defendant the 
opportunity to have a jury determine the key issue of credibility ra-
ther than permitting the trial judge to make the final assessment.190 
 
185 In United States v. Hasting, the majority summarized the defense evidence as follows: 
The evidence presented by them was testimony showing (a) that some of respond-
ents’ hair styles immediately before and after the incident differed from the vic-
tims’ descriptions of their assailants’ appearances, (b) that two of the victims had 
been unable to pick one of the respondents, Anderson, out of a lineup, (c) that it 
was so dark at the time of the attacks and during the car trips, that Newcomb did 
not have an unobstructed view of the rape he described, and (d) that Stewart’s 
mother testified that the girls she saw with her son did not look “scared.” 
  Id. at 511 (emphasis removed).  This is precisely the kind of evidence that may signal an 
inaccurate identification.  See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113–14 (1976) (de-
ferring to trial court’s assessment of harm flowing from the failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence).  See generally Gary L. Wells, What do we Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553 (1993) (discussing factors that contribute to false identifications).   
186 See, e.g., United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that trial court’s 
determination of materiality in Brady claim is accorded deference). 
187 United States v. Jernigan, 451 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 492 
F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The en banc court was divided. 
188 Jernigan, 492 F.3d at 1062–63 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
189 244 F.3d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 2001). 
190 See also United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 14–17 (1st Cir. 2000) (deferring to the trial 
court’s rejection of Brady claim based on its prediction of government’s response had the 
defendant possessed the evidence and conclusion that entrapment defense was con-
structed on “a thin reed”). 
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V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING HARM 
Better clarification of the definition and guidance as to the appli-
cation of these harm-assessing tests can alleviate the problem of 
blurred lines.  Currently, courts do not effectively differentiate 
among these harm-assessing tests, and there is little guidance as to 
how the tests should be applied.  Nevertheless, the courts maintain 
the illusion that the harm assessment tests, applied in cases implicat-
ing weighty defense interests or posing the likelihood of greater harm 
to the defendant, demand less of defendants.  But if the tests are ef-
fectively the same in application, then the courts are not giving de-
fendants more access to relief for some alleged violations than for 
others.  Moreover, as both the definition of the tests and their appli-
cation blur, making each test the same as the others, the burden on 
the defendant to show harm increases as courts employ the same ver-
dict-justifying avenues of reasoning to find lack of harm, regardless of 
the nature of the error, creating barriers to enforcement of protected 
rights.191 
The hazards are compounded by strong systemic forces that weigh 
against granting relief.  These forces make any lack of clarity work to 
the detriment of defendants.  All the harm assessment tests derive 
from the proposition that not every procedural shortcoming warrants 
a new trial.  The Constitution is concerned with “accurate and relia-
ble results” in criminal cases but does not guarantee a process that is 
entirely error-free.192  The interests in the finality of verdicts and in 
conserving resources encourage a government-friendly approach to 
harm assessment.193 
 
191 All tests that require the court to assess the harm of an alleged error stunt the develop-
ment of the law.  As the Court suggested in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695–96 
(1984), judges can bypass the determination of whether there was error, incompetence, 
or improper withholding of exculpatory evidence, and resolve the case by concluding 
that, regardless of whether there was error, it was harmless, there was no prejudice, or the 
evidence was not material.  The tendency to reject defense challenges on this basis is only 
amplified if the harm assessment standards are ill defined. 
192 See Smith, supra note 38, at 519 (discussing the purpose espoused by the Court in the 
crafting test); see also Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 13, at 839 (same). 
193 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983); United States v. Gandia-
Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that the plain error rule “serves obvious 
interests of fairness and judicial economy”).  See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 
853 (discussing reasons for harmless error doctrine).  In Hasting, the Court quoted Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Chief Justice Traynor that the goal of the harmless error doctrine 
is “to conserve judicial resources by enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial pro-
cess of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harmless error.”  461 U.S. at 509 (ci-
tations omitted). 
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In addition, reviewing a case to determine the harm of a particu-
lar error is necessarily challenging.194  With limited insight into what 
the jury actually considered and found persuasive, the court must de-
termine how the jury did or would react to particular evidence or ar-
guments.195  The task may entail a daunting amount of work.196  It 
takes less time and effort to affirm than to reverse.197  The temptation 
is to view the record favorably to the verdict winner (the government) 
and give short shrift to the defendant’s theories.  Judges who are not 
directed to adopt a more protective approach may be inclined simply 
to assure themselves of the defendant’s guilt and the likelihood of 
conviction in an error-free trial.198  A judge who believes that the de-
fendant will be convicted again on retrial has little incentive to re-
verse.199 
Furthermore, judges are not always well positioned to make a 
judgment about harm.  Commentators have identified a number of 
reasons why judicial assessments of harm may be flawed.200  Several 
 
194 See TRAYNOR, supra note 84, at 36 (describing the difficulty of the task faced by appellate 
judges when reviewing for harmless error). 
195 Teitelbaum, et al, supra note 84, at 1152 (discussing the difficult task of determining what 
information would have been relied on by a particular jury). 
196 In Hasting, 461 U.S. at 516–17, Justice John Paul Stevens described the practical challenge 
for an appellate court called on to review for harmless error.  He explained that the tran-
script of the trial was 1,013 pages and acknowledged that he had “read only a few of the 
450 pages of the transcript of the suppression hearing.”  Id. at 517.  He explained:  “The 
task of organizing and digesting the testimony is a formidable one.”  Id.  He lamented 
that: 
As a practical matter, it is impossible for any Member of this Court to make the 
kind of conscientious and detailed examination of the record that should precede 
a determination that there can be no reasonable doubt that the jury’s delibera-
tions as to each defendant were not affected by the alleged error. 
Id. 
197 See Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 193–94 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting the burden im-
posed on the system by ordering a new trial).  See generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:  A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 36 (2013). 
198 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 127 (arguing that “prevailing conceptions of out-
come-oriented standards violate the sixth amendment right to a jury trial by inviting 
judges to make probabilistic judgments of a defendant’s guilt based on their own views of 
the weight and credibility of evidence”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at § 853 
(pointing out tension between these two inquiries); Mitchell, supra note 55, at 1357 (ar-
guing that appellate review focused on whether an error contributed to the verdict is less 
fact-intensive than an inquiry into whether there was overwhelming evidence and is there-
fore more deferential and more appropriate). 
199 See Landes & Posner, supra note 53, at 175 (noting that the standard approach to assess-
ment of harmful error “makes it more likely that the appellate court will fail to detect a 
harmful error”). 
200 See Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 309 (describing confirmation bias); Solomon, supra 
note 8, at 1086–87 (describing hindsight bias and the attribution error); see also WRIGHT 
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psychological effects may also play a role:  hindsight bias, outcome 
bias, confirmation bias, and belief persistence.  Given that appellate 
judges consider almost exclusively the criminal cases of convicted de-
fendants, they are likely to be predisposed to view defendants as 
guilty and to have confidence in guilty verdicts.201  Hindsight bias en-
courages judges to regard the defendant’s conviction as a foregone 
conclusion and, therefore, see any error as harmless.202  Outcome bi-
as—the tendency to view a result as the correct result—also encour-
ages judges to uphold convictions as uninfluenced by error.203  Con-
firmation bias—the tendency to view evidence as supporting existing 
beliefs—may also play a role in judicial review.204  Belief persistence 
 
ET AL., supra note 20, § 853 (suggesting that the judge’s attitude will impact application of 
harmless error analysis). 
201 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 11 (noting that appeals by criminal defendants are 
subsidized—suggesting that frivolous appeals are therefore more likely—and “are so lack-
ing in merit that even liberal court of appeals judges usually vote to affirm”). 
202 Hindsight bias is the tendency to see outcomes (in these cases, the convictions) as inevi-
table.  See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight Bias and After-the-Fact Review of Inef-
fective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1-5 (2004) (discussing hindsight bias as 
an impediment to protection from ineffective assistance of counsel); Findley & Scott, su-
pra note 16, at 317–22 (discussing the impact of hindsight and outcome bias on harm as-
sessment); Solomon, supra note 8, at 1086.  Findley and Scott point out the hazard that 
“[u]nder [the harmless error] doctrine, cognitive biases can contribute in powerful ways 
to a conclusion that the defendant was indeed guilty, and that the error was therefore 
harmless.”  Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 350.  The authors further state that “doc-
trines that expressly shift the burden to prove that an alleged error might have affected 
the outcome of the case to the defendant are even more likely to reinforce cognitive- and 
role-based tunnel vision.”  Id.; see also Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification:  A 
Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis, 90 OR. L. REV. 69, 92 (2011).  The author explains: 
Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to overestimate the predictability of past 
events.  In other words, it makes the past seem more predictable than it actually 
was.  Hindsight bias occurs because learning an outcome causes people to update 
their beliefs about the world.  People then rely on these new beliefs to generate 
retroactive estimates of what was predictable.  In doing so, they ignore the fact that 
the outcome itself inspired the change in their beliefs.  Consequently, they con-
clude that the actual outcome was more predictable or foreseeable than it actually 
was. 
  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
203 See Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 319–20 (discussing outcome bias); see also Jonathan 
Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 569, 571 (1988) (stating that outcomes may focus a judge’s attention on evi-
dence that supports that decision); Terence R. Mitchell & Laura S. Kalb, Effects of Outcome 
Knowledge and Outcome Valence on Supervisors’ Evaluations, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 604, 605 
(1981) (reporting that outcome knowledge may influence a judge’s evaluation of a deci-
sion). 
204 See Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 309 (“Confirmation bias, as the term is used in psy-
chological literature, typically connotes the tendency to seek or interpret evidence in ways 
that support existing beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses.”); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 197, at 45 (discussing confirmation bias); John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hy-
pothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 27–29 
(1983) (reporting that expectancies lead to confirmation bias in the selective recall of ev-
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likewise weighs on the side of affirming convictions, leading judges 
faced with new evidence to commit to their original belief, sometimes 
either by simply ignoring the evidence or by actively scrutinizing the 
new evidence to undermine its effect.205  It is difficult for courts to re-
sist these pressures to dismiss identified errors as harmless.206  Indeed, 
the number of cases in which the court characterizes the prosecution 
evidence as overwhelming without careful scrutiny suggests biased re-
view.207 
An important question underlying this discussion is how the tests 
should relate to one another and how they should operate.  Both the 
definition of each test and its application control the defendant’s ac-
 
idence); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias:  A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guis-
es, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 193–94 (1998) (discussing confirmation bias in judicial pro-
ceedings). 
205 See Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 313–14 (defining belief persistence as the “natural 
tendencies [that] make people resistant to change even in the face of new evidence that 
wholly undermines their initial hypotheses”); see also Craig A. Anderson, et al., Perseverance 
of Social Theories:  The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1037–38, 1041–43 (1980) (observing the belief per-
severance effect even when the original belief was based on minimal and logically inade-
quate evidence and the person has no strong emotional or behavioral commitment to the 
prior evidence); Jerold L. Downey & Larry Christensen, Belief Persistence in Impression For-
mation, 8 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 479, 480, 484 (2006) (finding that the belief perseverance ef-
fect occurs even when discredited information is replaced with correct information); Lee 
Ross, et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception:  Biased Attributional Processes in 
the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 888 (1975) (demonstrat-
ing that a person’s beliefs persevere even after the basis for those beliefs have been dis-
credited). 
206 See Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 321; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No 
Clothes:  The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 632 (1986) (reporting that an analysis of 4,000 reported ap-
pellate decisions between 1970 and 1983 involving an ineffective assistance claim showed 
that only 3.9% resulted in a finding of reversible error).  Findley and Scott suggest: 
With hindsight knowledge that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, judges are likely to be predisposed to view the conviction as both inevi-
table and a sound decision, despite a procedural or constitutional error in the 
proceedings.  To some extent, placing the burden of proving the harmless nature 
of an error on the beneficiary of the error—in criminal cases, requiring the gov-
ernment to prove harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt—might be intended 
to mitigate the effects of hindsight and outcome biases.  Nonetheless, courts rou-
tinely find significant errors harmless, and that is partly because hindsight bias and 
outcome bias work in tandem with other values, such as a desire to respect finality 
and avoid wasteful retrials of obviously guilty defendants. 
  Findley & Scott, supra note 16, at 321 (footnotes omitted). 
207 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 130–31 (noting that courts deem error harmless if 
the evidence of guilt is “overwhelming” even without assuring themselves that the evi-
dence “would compel a rational jury resolving all reasonable evidentiary conflicts in the 
defendant’s favor to convict as a matter of law”).  The authors further argue that over-
whelming evidence analysis is applied with no “objective indicia” and less restrictively 
than asking if rational jury would be compelled not to convict.  Id. 
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cess to relief when there was a flaw in the process.  The more gov-
ernment-friendly the harm assessment test, the more likely the court 
will conclude that the defendant suffered no harm when the defend-
ant actually suffered harm but is simply unable to satisfy the applica-
ble test.  Thus, a more significant right should call for a less demand-
ing harm assessment test.  Conversely, when the claim is less 
deserving or the countervailing interests stronger, the harm assess-
ment test can fairly demand more from the defendant.  The pro-
posals set out below are intended to achieve an appropriate balance 
between protecting defendants’ rights and preserving government in-
terests. 
In the sections that follow, I advocate for changes to clarify the 
tests and guide their application.  First, I argue that the courts should 
reduce the number of tests and the reliance on small differences in 
language, clearly allocate and define the burden of proof, and dis-
courage courts from rejecting claims of harm based merely on the 
sufficiency of the evidence or the apparent strength of the govern-
ment’s case.  I then prescribe an approach to applying the tests that 
will lead to more careful consideration of the defense’s claims of 
harm. 
A. Reduce the Number of Tests 
Courts do not distinguish effectively among the current array of 
harm assessment tests.  Instead of expecting fine differences in the 
language that defines the tests to play out in differences in protec-
tion, the courts should reduce the number of tests to a manageable 
number of meaningfully defined tests.  In all cases in which the de-
fendant bears the burden of establishing harm, the courts should ap-
ply the same test.  When the issue is harmless error, the burden falls 
on the government, and the test should be more demanding. 
The differentiation between the two harmless error tests is well es-
tablished by existing law.  The line between the Kotteakos and Chap-
man harmless error tests reflects the recognition that constitutional 
rights command more protection than non-constitutional rules.  The 
more-demanding Chapman test assures that courts will less readily 
dismiss a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights as harm-
less.  When applying the harmless error tests, where the government 
bears the burden, courts should require the government to establish 
the harmlessness of non-constitutional error by a preponderance and 
the harmlessness of constitutional error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The adoption of a uniform test in all other harm assessment tests, 
however, may be controversial.  But a uniform harm standard, ap-
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plied appropriately, will still provide appropriate differentiation 
based on the countervailing concerns underlying the current tests.  
The two tests that are currently the least defendant-friendly are those 
governing Rule 33 new trial motions and the plain error test.  The 
strict requirements for a new trial motion under Rule 33 reflect the 
strong interest in allowing a verdict untainted by error to stand.  The 
defendant who received an error-free trial resulting in conviction 
should not easily win a “do over.”  The courts do not want to reward a 
defendant for deferring aspects of the defense investigation until af-
ter conviction.  Only a strong showing that the omission of the now 
discovered evidence harmed the defendant should justify a new trial.  
Similarly, the heightened showing required under the plain error 
rule reflects the court’s desire to encourage the defense to be atten-
tive and raise errors in the trial, rather than holding back and expect-
ing—even hoping—to be able to attack an unfavorable verdict.208 
Adoption of a uniform harm test may appear to inappropriately 
reduce the barriers to relief in instances of new trial motions and 
plain error review.  It does not.  Both Rule 33 motions and plain er-
ror review do not turn solely on the standard of harm.  Both tests re-
quire the defendant to clear substantial additional hurdles and, fur-
ther, give the court discretion to deny relief even if the defendant 
meets those requirements. 
On the other hand, the adoption of a uniform test may appear 
not to provide sufficient protection when the identified flaws serious-
ly threaten the fairness of the process.209  However, the current tests 
 
208 In United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004), the Court recognized that 
plain error review calls for a demanding test “to encourage timely objections and reduce 
wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error.”  
See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465–66 (1997) (emphasizing the obliga-
tion of the parties at trial to take appropriate steps to assure the fairness and accuracy of 
the trial and allow errors to be corrected promptly); United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 
505 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“It is supposed to be harder to show 
plain error (when the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the district 
court) than to show harmless error (when the defendant did raise the issue, and the 
judge wrongly rejected the argument).”); United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1106–
07 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (refusing, on appeal, to allow the defense to bring in dubious new ev-
idence that could have been discovered and used at an earlier stage). 
209 Before the Court held that materiality in nondisclosure cases are governed by the reason-
able probability test, the Courts of Appeals had applied less government-friendly tests.  In 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976), for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals had 
“assumed that the prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to disclose any information 
that might affect the jury’s verdict.”  The Court condemned that approach as setting the 
bar too low, stating that the approach was too close to the “sporting theory of justice” ex-
pressly rejected in Brady.  Id.  The Court explained that “a jury’s appraisal of a case 
‘might’ be affected by an improper or trivial consideration as well as by evidence giving 
rise to a legitimate doubt on the issue of guilt.”  Id. at 108–09.  As a result, the Court con-
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are not particularly defense-friendly.  Even when the defendant 
demonstrates nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence or incompe-
tence of counsel, either of which creates a risk of unfairness and pos-
sibly skews the record created at trial, the test places a burden on the 
defendant that necessarily results in some convictions being affirmed 
even though the nondisclosure actually harmed the defendant.  The 
protection must lie in the application of the test, and not its defini-
tion. 
Yet another concern of adopting a uniform test is the apparent 
diminution of protection in false testimony cases if the courts no 
longer apply the “reasonable likelihood” test in false testimony cases 
rather than the harm assessment test applied in nondisclosure cases.  
There are two responses to that concern.  First, the protection is illu-
sory even under the current “reasonable likelihood” standard of ma-
teriality.  That test does not reliably translate into a more protective 
assessment.210  Second, protection can be implemented through care-
ful application of the test.  The corrupting effect of false testimony 
explains the current more defendant-friendly materiality test in false 
testimony cases.211  That corrupting effect should become a factor in 
the court’s assessment of materiality.  For example, if courts view the 
evidence in a light favorable to the defendant and apply both back-
ward-looking and forward-looking analyses, as described below, they 
are likely to conclude that false testimony is material unless the wit-
ness was entirely peripheral to the case. 
The language used to define the uniform harm assessment test to 
be applied when the defendant bears the burden of showing harm 
should avoid the problems of the current tests, which rely too heavily 
 
cluded:  “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiali-
ty’ in the constitutional sense.”  Id. at 109–10. 
210 See generally Poulin, supra note 12 (discussing ways in which courts have diluted protection 
in false testimony cases). 
211 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679–80 (1985); see Poulin, supra note 12; see also 
United States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636, 644 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing reasons for applying 
a less demanding test when a new trial motion is based on demonstration that testimony 
at the first trial was false).  In Willis, the court explained that typically, in new evidence 
situations, the court is concerned that “defendants might sandbag the prosecution, wait-
ing to see if they are convicted before bringing forth new evidence in an attempt to get a 
second chance at acquittal.”  Id.  In contrast, if the defendant relies on a claim of false tes-
timony, sandbagging is not an issue; instead, the concern is that pressure may have been 
applied to persuade the witness to recant.  But the court saw sufficient protection against 
this risk in two checks:  first, the court must be “reasonably well satisfied that the original 
testimony given by the now-recanting government witness was false” and, second, the 
prosecution can bring perjury charges against the recanting witness.  Id. at 645 (citations 
omitted). 
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on small differences in language.  The courts should recognize that 
there is no meaningful distinction among the current “reasonable 
probability,” “reasonable likelihood,” and “actual probability” tests.  
In framing the test going forward, courts should avoid the use of the 
word “probability,” which encourages courts to require persuasion at 
the preponderance level.  Instead, the test should be framed as re-
quiring the defendant to show a reasonable likelihood or significant 
possibility.  The particular choice of language is not critical. 
B. Clearly Allocate and Define the Burden of Proof 
The allocation and definition of the burden of proof may be out-
come-determinative.212  In evenly balanced cases, or cases where nec-
essary information is unavailable to either party, the party with the 
burden will lose.213  The courts should be clear concerning which par-
ty bears the burden and what standard should be applied. 
It is important that the court applying each test be clear as to 
which party bears the risk of uncertainty.  In most of these tests, the 
allocation is clear:  the burden lies with the defendant to establish 
harm in all but the harmless error tests.214  However, the Court has 
 
212 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2010).  The 
court held against the defendant under a plain error standard, explaining that the bur-
den of proof determined the outcome: 
We recognize that Agent Crawford’s testimony appears to have played an im-
portant role in this case:  without Agent Crawford’s testimony, the first jury failed 
to return a unanimous verdict; with Agent Crawford’s testimony, a second jury 
unanimously convicted Gonzalez-Rodriguez.  Were it the Government’s burden to 
establish harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, our conclusion today might 
be different. 
  Id. (citations omitted); see also Edwards, supra note 13, at 1201–03 (discussing importance 
of allocation of the burden). 
213 For example, in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 727 (1993), the defendant appealed 
based on the claim that alternate jurors were allowed to sit in on the deliberations.  There 
was no way to assess the impact of this error on the case, so the defendant could not es-
tablish plain error.  Id. at 737–41. 
214 Unfortunately, placing the burden of proof on the defendant results in affirming more 
convictions than would be the case if the burden of proof was on the prosecution. 
Rossman, supra note 53, at 527.  Rossman cites Justice Scalia, concurring in Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 503 (1992), a school desegregation case, in which the Court states that 
the allocation of the burden of proof “foreordains the results.”  Id. at 527 n.453.  As Jus-
tice Sandra O’Connor pointed out, dissenting in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the standard of 
harmless error applied determines the level of confidence that the verdict is reliable de-
spite the problem that occurred at trial.  507 U.S. 619, 653 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing).  In her view, the Kotteakos standard did not “offer[] an adequate assurance of relia-
bility” when a trial error might have affected the accuracy of the outcome.  Id.  Justice 
O’Connor explained:  “By tolerating a greater probability that an error with the potential 
to undermine verdict accuracy was harmful, the Court increases the likelihood that a 
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generated some uncertainty about the placement of the burden in 
instances of non-constitutional error, when the Kotteakos test applies.  
In these instances, the Court should place the burden of establishing 
harmless error unequivocally on the government. 
The courts should also define the burden clearly.  Placing the 
burden of establishing harm on the defendant necessarily means 
that, in some cases, the problem of which the defendant complains 
actually harmed the defendant, but the defendant will not be able to 
carry the burden of demonstrating harm.  The result may be an un-
corrected threat to the defendant’s rights and the fairness of the pro-
cess.215  One partial antidote to this hazard is a clearly defined bur-
den.  Although the Court has stated that the harm assessment tests do 
not require the defendant to show harm by a preponderance of the 
evidence, there is a risk that the courts applying the test will impose 
this higher burden.  Continuing to frame the tests in terms of proba-
bility and likelihood increases that risk.216  The Court should continue 
to stress the limited nature of the defendant’s burden in these cases. 
C. Emphasize That the Apparent Strength of the Government Case Should 
Not Be Sufficient to Overcome a Claim of Harm 
Each of these harm assessment tests emphasizes factual support 
for the conviction rather than the importance of procedural regulari-
ty of the proceeding.  As a result, the tests necessarily permit convic-
tions to stand despite procedural shortcomings.  But the courts 
 
conviction will be preserved despite an error that actually affected the reliability of the 
trial.”  Id. 
215 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511–12 (1983).  Justice William Brennan, writing 
separately, noted: 
The case is made even stronger if we consider, as the discussion in text does not, 
the interests of criminal defendants in having their constitutional rights protected.  
Whether or not an error ultimately is determined to be harmless, a defendant’s 
rights still have been violated.  Criminal defendants have an even stronger interest 
in being protected from intentional violations of their constitutional rights, espe-
cially in view of the difficulties surrounding harmless error inquiries. 
  Id.. at 527 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring).  As the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. 
Rodriguez, “[a] defendant’s liberty should not so often depend upon our struggle with the 
particular circumstances of a case to determine from a cold record whether or not the 
prosecutor’s remarks were harmless.”  627 F.2d 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1980). 
216 One can reason that “[r]equiring a quantum of proof beyond equipoise is the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard” and the reasonable probability test requires less than 
the preponderance standard, so equipoise must be sufficient to establish reasonable 
probability.  Rodriguez, 406 F.3d at 1299 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (emphasis removed); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 
86–87 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (applying plain error test and concluding that prej-
udice must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and not merely “reasona-
ble probability,” arguing that less demanding standard was not “serviceable”). 
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should not amplify this emphasis by affirming simply because the 
government seems to have a strong case.  The Court has stated that 
the determination should not turn on the reviewing court’s assess-
ment of the defendant’s guilt217 and that the harm assessment tests 
require more than mere sufficient evidence.  Nevertheless, courts 
continue to emphasize the adequacy of the government’s case in dis-
cussing harm.218  Some courts assert that overwhelming evidence sup-
ports the conviction without carefully considering the possibility of 
harm.219  Equally troubling, some courts accept less than overwhelm-
ing evidence as adequate to support a finding of no harm.220  The 
courts should demand more searching assessment of harm.  While 
addressing the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the 
reviewing court should adopt the approach described below. 
D. Prescribe an Approach to Applying the Tests 
The way in which courts apply the tests will either enhance the 
protection of the defendant or increase the likelihood that an error 
that actually harmed the defendant will not be redressed.  Yet, differ-
ent judges take markedly different approaches to harm assessment.  
That variation was apparent in the division of the Court of Appeals in 
Vasquez:  the majority viewed the evidence in a light favorable to the 
government and the dissenting judge looked at the dynamics of the 
trial and jury deliberation, recognized that the jury might draw infer-
ences favorable to the defendant, and placed the error in the context 
of the defense presented.221  Only by expressly adopting a specific and 
 
217 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763–64 (1946) (explaining that the role of 
the appellate court is not to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence and not “to 
speculate upon probable reconviction,” but to take the trial outcome into account and as-
sess the effect of the error). 
218 For example, applying the harmless error test, judges sometimes inquire only whether 
“independent evidence of guilt taken alone could support the conviction,” an assessment 
that closely resembles the test for sufficiency of the evidence.  Findley, supra note 16, at 
350 (noting that some courts “broadly search the record by asking whether independent 
evidence of guilt taken alone could support the conviction” (emphasis removed)); see 
Edwards, supra note 13, at 1187 (noting that many courts hold error harmless if the evi-
dence of guilt is sufficient). 
219 See Anderson, supra note 53, at 395 (suggesting that harmless error analysis is often “cur-
sory, with little explanation” (footnotes omitted)). 
220 See Edwards, supra note 13, at 1204–06 (discussing the hazard of focusing on the admissi-
ble evidence of guilt); Field, supra note 150, at 21–36 (arguing against the overwhelming 
evidence approach to harmless error analysis); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 128–30 
(arguing that some courts treat the test as a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry). 
221 United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009).  Applying the harmless error test, 
judges sometimes inquire whether the actual jury was likely influenced by the error, 
sometimes focus on whether the jury would have convicted absent the error, and some-
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uniform approach to harm assessment will the courts protect the de-
fendant’s rights. 
United States v. Jernigan, a nondisclosure case, also illustrates the 
importance of the approach taken to assess harm.222   In Jernigan, the 
defendant claimed mistaken identity, but her description—a short, 
Hispanic or Asian woman, with a poor complexion—matched the de-
scription of the bank robber, and eyewitnesses identified her as the 
robber; she was convicted at trial.223  Before trial, while the defendant 
was in custody, two additional bank robberies were committed in the 
same area by a woman fitting the same description.224  The prosecu-
tion did not share any of this information with the defense.225  The 
other robber was eventually identified and arrested through a track-
ing device in money taken in yet another robbery, committed after 
defendant’s trial.226  The defendant learned of these events from fel-
low prison inmates.227  She then sought a new trial.228  She argued that 
the evidence specifically supported her defense of mistaken identifi-
cation and that disclosure would have influenced her trial strategy.229  
The panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments, 
deferring to the trial court and assessing the eyewitness identification 
testimony in a light favorable to the government.230  A majority of the 
court sitting en banc demonstrated a better understanding of the va-
garies of eyewitness identification, viewed the evidence in a light fa-
vorable to the defense, identified weaknesses in the government’s 
case, and reversed the conviction.231. 
The courts should implement an approach to applying the harm 
assessing tests that will better guide the application of the various tests 
 
times ask what a reasonable jury would do absent the error.  See Field, supra note 150 (dis-
cussing approaches to harmless error analysis); Solomon, supra note 8, at 1062 (discuss-
ing approaches to harmless error); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 126–30 (discussing 
variations in application of harmless error test). 
222 492 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
223 Id. at 1051–52. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 1052–53. 
227 Id.  
228 Id. at 1053.  Because some of the information had been known to the government before 
her trial and some had not, she raised both a Brady claim and a Rule 33 new trial motion.  
Id. 
229 United States v. Jernigan, 451 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2006), reversed and remanded, 492 F.3d 
1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
230 Jernigan, 451 F.3d at 1033.  The dissent from the en banc decision criticized the majority 
for its lack of deference to the trial court and for giving too little weight to the prosecu-
tion evidence.  Id. at 1062-65. 
231 Jernigan, 492 F.3d at 1054–57. 
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and also provide greater protection.  The courts should adopt the fol-
lowing rules for assessing harm.  They should view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendant, examine the role of the error 
in the trial, giving weight to the defense theory of the case, and apply 
both backward-looking and forward-looking analyses.  In addition, 
the courts should accord more weight to signals sent by the jury and 
also recognize that jurors may react more strongly than judges to cer-
tain evidence.  Finally, the courts should limit the degree of defer-
ence to the trial court.  These steps are discussed below. 
1. View the evidence in a light favorable to the defendant 
Appellate courts are accustomed to applying tests that view the ev-
idence in a light favorable to the verdict winner.  These harm assess-
ment tests operate only after conviction, so courts will be drawn to an 
approach that favors the government.232  Moreover, by placing the 
burden on the defendant, the harm assessment tests create additional 
bias in favor of affirming the conviction, which also increases the like-
lihood that the court will view the record in a light favorable to the 
government.  Instead, when assessing harm, the court should recog-
nize that a different fact finder could draw the inferences in favor of 
the defendant and should therefore draw all inferences in favor of 
the defendant, giving weight to arguments that reframe the evidence 
in light of the identified error.233  Adopting this defense-friendly per-
 
232 See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258–59 (1988) (rejecting state court’s application 
of Chapman as too favorable to the government and too close to measuring only the suffi-
ciency of the evidence where the state court reasoned that “the properly admitted evi-
dence was such that the minds of an average jury would have found the State’s 
case . . . sufficient . . . even [without the erroneously admitted evidence]”); see also Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  In Neder, the Court stated that the Chapman test re-
quires a court to ask whether a jury could reasonably find in favor of the defendant, thus 
recognizing that the court must view the evidence in a light favorable to the defendant.  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.  The court nevertheless concluded that the failure to instruct the ju-
ry on an element of the offense constituted harmless error in that case.  Id. at 19–20. See 
also id. at 32–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing application of test as tantamount to di-
recting a verdict for the prosecution).  In Vasquez, the government rejected the sugges-
tion that inferences should be drawn in favor of the defendant, even though the burden 
of showing harmlessness was on the government.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–55, 
Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532 (2012) (No. 11-199). 
233 See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2006) (reversing 
trial denial of a Rule 33 motion, which was based on the view that the circumstantial evi-
dence against the defendant was insurmountable, and concluding that the trial court 
failed to recognize the full potential force the new evidence would have if accepted by the 
jury); see also United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
Kotteakos test requires the court to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant); United 
States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the government 
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spective should lead the court to recognize that the jury might have 
developed a reasonable doubt or credited different evidence if the 
case were tried without the flaw.234  Taking this approach, courts 
should not dismiss claims of harm simply because the government’s 
case is strong, the evidence in question is merely cumulative or im-
peaching, or the defense is unpersuasive to the court.235 
The determination of which inferences to draw is especially criti-
cal when the case against the defendant is circumstantial.236   In such 
 
had not established lack of harm, because “the government has not shown that a reason-
able jury would have put aside relevant, impeaching evidence about the government’s key 
witness and reached a similar verdict had it heard the excluded cross-examination”).  The 
question can also be framed as asking whether any reasonable jury could have found the 
defendant not guilty.  See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 133–34 (arguing that the court 
should resolve case on grounds that evidence against defendant is overwhelming only if it 
resolved all inferences in the defendant’s favor); Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 1189–90 
(discussing this “directed verdict” approach). 
   When the court does not give the government the benefit of the inferences, the de-
fendant is more likely to prevail, but reversal will not be automatic.  See, e.g., United States 
v. White, 341 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2003) (ultimately concluding that the defendant did not 
suffer prejudice); United States v. Nickerson, 556 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (exam-
ining how trial would have proceeded had counsel performed competently but conclud-
ing that defendant was not prejudiced). 
234 See, e.g., United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 255 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that new evi-
dence, if believed, was more favorable to the defendants and that, even though it was by 
no means clear that the defendants would be able to persuade the jury to draw the infer-
ences in their favor, they should have the opportunity to do so). 
235 When courts reject claims of harm because evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching, 
they rely on their own assessment of the witness’s credibility, rather than giving the de-
fendant the opportunity to have a jury assess the witness’s credibility in light of the addi-
tional impeachment information.  See, e.g., United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 953 (8th 
Cir. 2011); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 38–39 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting Brady 
claimed based on impeachment evidence); United States v. Emor, 573 F.3d 778, 782 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting Brady claim on ground evidence would have offered only cu-
mulative impeachment of a type already used at trial); see also Field, supra note 150 (criti-
cizing the overwhelming evidence approach and also suggesting that the cumulative evi-
dence test should be narrowed to provide appropriate protection for the defendant); 
Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 134 (suggesting that court employ cumulative evidence 
analysis only if the “evidence is cumulative as a matter of law”). 
236 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967) (pointing to the circumstantial na-
ture of the case and concluding that “honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have 
brought in not guilty verdicts”); see also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 
(1969).  In Harrington, the majority affirmed, relying on the strength of the government 
case and noting that the case before it “was not woven from circumstantial evidence;” 
however, the dissenting Justices pointed out weaknesses in the government’s case that 
might have led to acquittal had the inadmissible evidence not been admitted.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Brodwin, 292 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging 
that “some presentation of the circumstantial evidence, under a different theory of pros-
ecution” could result in a conviction of the defendants, but concluding that “the circum-
stantial evidence would probably not have been sufficient, and thus the new evidence 
would probably result in an acquittal”). 
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cases, harm assessment necessarily requires the court to determine 
which inferences the jury could or would have drawn in the absence 
of the error.  Analysis that draws inferences in favor of the govern-
ment will generally yield a finding of no harm, whereas assessment 
that recognizes the jury’s province to draw pro-defense inferences is 
more likely to find harm. 
Similarly, this approach is also likely to result in a finding of harm 
if the case turns on credibility.  In United States v. Carmichael, for ex-
ample, the trial court granted a new trial when a witness, who had 
lied to the grand jury and was not called at trial, came forward to con-
fess that the gun was his after the defendant was convicted of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.237  The court emphasized the im-
portance of giving the defendant the chance to have the jury evaluate 
the evidence238 and concluded that the defendant was entitled to have 
the jury assess the credibility of this exculpatory testimony, despite 
the fact that it contained some inconsistencies and contradicted the 
defendant’s account to some degree.239 
This approach is crucial in cases where the defendant shows that 
counsel was incompetent, the government failed to correct false tes-
timony, or the government withheld exculpatory evidence.  In cases 
that turn on the assessment of prejudice or materiality, the underly-
ing problem may skew the record against the defendant.240  Only a re-
view that takes the evidence in a light favorable to the defendant and 
entertains the possibility that the jury may have weighed the case dif-
ferently protects the defendant against these violations.241 
 
237 United States v. Carmichael, 269 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593, 600 (D.N.J. 2003). 
238 Id. at 599. 
239 Id. at 599–600.  The court did not see the inconsistencies as critical and, further, based on 
the circumstances of the witness’s confession and the existence of corroboration for some 
of the witness’s account, concluded that the witness was credible. 
240 See Klein, supra note 13, at 1467 (noting that record may be skewed by counsel’s incompe-
tence); see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 131 (criticizing materiality and prejudice 
tests because “there are no objective factors upon which courts can rely in determining 
the probability of various reasonable resolutions of evidentiary conflicts and, hence, of 
various reasonable outcomes”).  The authors also note: 
Few courts have construed [the reasonable probability] standard to mean that a 
defendant need only demonstrate that a jury could reasonably acquit based in part 
on the evidence in question, or that counsel’s unprofessional errors could reason-
ably have influenced a jury.  Rather, courts have considered only whether there is 
a substantial probability that a jury would acquit based on the evidence sought or 
an improved performance by counsel. . . . [Courts] must depend only on their 
own perceptions of the strength and credibility of the evidence. 
  Id. 
241 See Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing risk of improper review 
and stating that the assessment requires “a careful, balanced evaluation of the nature and 
strength of both the evidence the defense was prevented from presenting and the evi-
 
Apr. 2015] HARM IN CRIMINAL CASES 1051 
 
In Smith v. Cain, for example, the majority of the Court took this 
approach and held that the State had violated Brady.242  Chief Justice 
John Roberts, writing for the majority, pointed out that both the State 
and the dissent based their assessment of materiality on pro-
prosecution inferences the jury could draw to convict the defendant 
despite the new evidence, but that the Court could not be confident 
that the jury would have favored the government in that way.243  If the 
court does not review the evidence in the light favorable to the de-
fendant, it threatens the role of the jury.244 
2. Examine the Role of the Error in the Trial, Giving Weight to the 
Defense Theory of the Case 
To assess harm, the court should analyze in detail the relationship 
between all the errors of which the defendant complains and the dy-
namic of the trial.245  The court should consider the theory of the de-
fense, the timing of the error in the course of the trial, the parties’ 
opening and closing arguments, prosecution conduct in relation to 
the error, and the jury instructions presented at trial to determine 
whether any of these aspects of the trial heightens the significance of 
the flaw.246  Viewing the record in a light favorable to the defendant 
 
dence each side presented at trial”) (quoting Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 
2001)). 
242 132 S. Ct. 627, 631 (2012). 
243 Id. at 630.  See also González-Soberal v. United States, 244 F.3d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(considering defendant’s ineffective assistance claim and acknowledging that, while there 
was significant evidence of guilt, it had “little basis for estimating how the jury would have 
perceived” the new evidence). 
244 If the court determines guilt and therefore finds no harm, the jury is deprived of the op-
portunity to perform its function of assessing the evidence and determining guilt or in-
nocence.  See Edwards, supra note 13, at 1192 (arguing that reliance on appellate assess-
ment of harm to affirm convictions threatens to usurp role of jury); Field, supra note 150, 
at 33 and 52–53 (arguing that the “overwhelming evidence” test for harmless error usurps 
the role of the jury); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 127 (suggesting a harmless error 
approach drawn from civil procedure that examines the impact of the error on a reason-
able jury and draws all inferences in the defendant’s favor and arguing that such a test is 
necessary to protect the role of the jury); Teitelbaum, et al, supra note 8, at 1180 (arguing 
that if appellate court focuses on factual guilt, it supplants jury). 
245 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1995) (holding that materiality should be 
judged by the cumulative effect of the non-disclosed evidence); see also Blume & Seeds, 
supra note 37, at 1154 (arguing that all sources of potential harm in a case should be cu-
mulated in determining whether the defendant is entitled to relief). 
246 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 701 (7th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the likely 
reaction of the jurors to the improperly admitted evidence, mentioning the “vigorous de-
fense” and the government use of improper evidence); United States v. Bentley, 489 F.3d 
360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering impact of allowing the jury to see cash that had 
not actually been admitted as evidence and concluding that the cash added little to the 
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should also prompt courts to consider the defense theory more seri-
ously, recognizing that jurors could accept the posited defense.  In 
addition, the court should ask if the flaw affected the defense strategy 
in the case.247 
A number of decisions model this type of analysis.248  In González-
Soberal v. United States, for example, the First Circuit remanded the 
 
prosecution case and did not undermine the defense); United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 
110, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing “the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to improperly ad-
mitted evidence” as one of four considerations in determining harmless error); United 
States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 46–48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing in detail how the inad-
missible evidence fit into the case and concluding that the defendant “did not suffer per-
ceptible prejudice”); United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (explain-
ing that the “Kotteakos standard requires a reviewing court to examine the entire record, 
focusing particularly on the erroneously admitted [evidence]” to “discern whether the 
[wrongfully admitted evidence], in light of the whole record, ‘substantially influenced’ 
the outcome of the trial” or left the court in “grave doubt” as to its effect); United States 
v. Brown, 921 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding error harmless, noting that pros-
ecutors “did not exploit” the erroneously admitted evidence); United States v. Colombo, 
909 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the introduction of inadmissible prej-
udicial information was not harmless because defendant’s credibility was crucial to his de-
fense and because the prosecution’s focus on the improperly admitted evidence counter-
acted the effect of the trial court’s limiting instruction); United States v. King, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 636, 645 (E.D. Va. 2002) (considering prosecution’s reliance on false testimony 
in argument to the jury); see also Field, supra note 150, at 42–44 (suggesting that different 
items of evidence may have very different impacts on the jury); Solomon, supra note 8, at 
1095–97 (providing recommendations to judges as they conduct harmless-error analyses 
to “match the normative ideal of accurate determinations of factual causation”). 
   The court should also consider weaknesses in the government’s case.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138, 147 (1st Cir. 2006) (granting motion for 
new trial where evidence presented against the defendant in the first trial was sufficient to 
support his conviction but not so strong that it would “overwhelm” the new evidence and 
preclude a likelihood of acquittal); United States v. Arroyo, 301 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226 (D. 
Conn. 2004) (granting motion for a new trial, noting that the evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt was “hardly overwhelming” and that a new trial should be granted only in “most ex-
traordinary circumstances”); King, 232 F. Supp. at 651 (highlighting weakness of govern-
ment case and granting new trial); see also United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 119 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (noting that the trial court found “[p]ersuasive independent evidence” of de-
fendant’s guilt and affirming the denial of the new trial motion). 
247 See Blume & Seeds, supra note 37, at 1168–74 (discussing the Strickland prejudice and Bag-
ley materiality tests); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 990 (discussing relationship between er-
ror and trial strategy, suggesting that as a result of error “[a] meritorious line of defense 
may be dropped, an important witness held back, or entire strategies abandoned even 
though they should prevail”). 
248 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 898 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming the lower 
court’s decision and concluding that the district judge’s erroneous admission of evidence 
was ultimately harmless); United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 162–
63 (2d Cir. 2008) (looking closely at relationship between undisclosed evidence and de-
fense and reversing district court finding that evidence did not support defendant’s posi-
tion); United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding non-
disclosed impeachment evidence was material by examining how it supported the defense 
and undermined the prosecution narrative);  United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d 399, 405–
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case because “[t]he district court did not point to the possible limited 
value of the impeachment testimony, to the effectiveness of the cross-
examination of the two government witnesses otherwise, to the 
strength of the available evidence against the defendant, or to any 
other factor or factors that may have been observed and noted by the 
district court.”249  In finding harm, the court reviewed the evidence 
carefully, focusing on the lack of corroboration of the government’s 
evidence and the vulnerable credibility of the two key prosecution 
witnesses.250  Similarly, in United States v. Price, the Ninth Circuit grant-
ed relief even though the undisclosed information was merely im-
peachment evidence.  The court looked closely at the importance of 
the witness to the verdict, the vulnerability of the government’s case, 
and the way in which the defendant could have used the new evi-
dence.251 
It is particularly critical for the reviewing court to consider the de-
fense theory of the case, not only looking at the theory advanced at 
the first trial, but also considering how the defense might approach a 
retrial.  In United States v. Jernigan,252 the judges who ultimately over-
turned the conviction recognized that the Brady material spoke di-
 
07 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding, over dissent, that non-disclosed evidence was material, in 
part because it supported the theory of the defense and ultimately concluding that the 
defendant did not receive a fair trial); United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 336 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (reversing trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence because the trial court had not recognized that the new ev-
idence specifically supported the defendant’s theory of the case); United States v. Rea, 
958 F.2d 1206, 1221 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding error harmless in part because prosecution 
did not mention the improper opinion in argument and in part due to signals sent by ju-
ry); see also United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 993–95 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., dis-
senting) (disagreeing with conclusion that evidence was not material and pointing out 
that the prosecution was able to foster a false and favorable impression in the presenta-
tion of its case and in argument and attack the defendant’s credibility due to the absence 
of the undisclosed evidence). 
249 244 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 2001). 
250 Id. at 278–79. 
251 See 566 F.3d 900, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “impeachment evidence is especially 
likely to be material when it impugns the testimony of a witness who is critical to the 
prosecution’s case” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 517–
18 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  In Cuffie, the D.C. Circuit found undisclosed impeachment evidence 
to be material despite the availability of other avenues of impeachment at trial.  The court 
noted that the undisclosed evidence demonstrated that the witness had committed per-
jury and could therefore have “a significant impact on the fairness of the trial.”  Id. at 518. 
252 492 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reversing the district court decision and 
holding that the government’s suppression of material evidence deprived the defendant 
of a fair trial); see also United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting government effort to persuade court that the defendant’s theory was not credible 
and emphasizing that “competing theories about the case are matters for a jury’s consid-
eration”). 
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rectly to the defense of mistaken identity.  Similarly, in United States v. 
Gil, the Second Circuit found a Brady violation because the undis-
closed memo specifically corroborated the defense and the govern-
ment had argued that the defense was unsupported by any documen-
tation; as a result, the court concluded that the memo was material.253  
The court’s rejection of the defense theory supplants the role of the 
jurors to assess credibility and weight of the evidence. 
Taking this approach should also provide robust protection in 
false testimony cases.  When Bagley was remanded, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that the witnesses had testified falsely, contradicting the 
now-disclosed evidence that they had received benefits for their tes-
timony.254  The court stated “[i]t is inconceivable that evidence of per-
jury would not, as an objective matter, affect a factfinder’s assessment 
of a witness’ credibility.”255  The court also recognized that, had the 
prosecution given the information to the defense at trial, the defend-
ant’s trial strategy might have been different and “might have result-
ed in [the defendant’s] acquittal.”256  This tack should make reversal 
more likely in false testimony cases.257 
3. Apply Both Backward Looking and Forward Looking Analysis 
The reviewing court should also assess the impact of the error 
from two vantage points.  The court should not only attempt to de-
termine the impact of the error at the time of the initial trial (this ju-
ry, this trial), but should also consider the likely outcome of an error-
free trial (a future reasonable jury, error-free trial).258  In addition, 
 
253 297 F.3d 93, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2002).  In Gil, the trial court had stated “assuming the very 
best scenario for the defense, [the memo] would [not] have made a whit’s bit of differ-
ence to the jury in their review of the evidence,” but the Second Circuit, looking more 
closely at the relationship between the exculpatory evidence and the defense in the case 
as well as the prosecution’s argument, concluded the evidence was material.  Id.  See also 
Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Bailey, the state courts concluded 
that the evidence was cumulative and would not have altered the outcome.  Examining 
the role the evidence could have played more closely, the Ninth Circuit that the undis-
closed evidence was material because it would have “changed the dynamic” of the trial.  
Id.   
254 Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1986). 
255 Id. at 1301. 
256 Id. 
257 See United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the standard 
created a rule of “virtual automatic reversal”). 
258 See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 374–75 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that, when a mo-
tion is based on recantation, the trial court must determine, in part, whether the jury 
might have reached a different conclusion in the absence of the now-recanted testimony 
and then ask whether the new testimony “would probably produce an acquittal”); United 
States v. Del-Valle, 566 F.3d 31, 39–41 (1st Cir. 2009) (looking backward and conducting 
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the court should ask what would have happened at the first trial had 
the error been exposed to the jury before they retired to deliberate.  
The court should then give the defendant the benefit of the most fa-
vorable of these assessments. 
When the defendant complains of an error such as counsel’s in-
competence, nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, or false testimo-
ny, the court should recognize that the error may have skewed the 
defense strategy in the initial trial.259  If the defense plausibly argues 
that the error affected the strategy at the trial that led to the convic-
tion, the court should not just assess the actual impact on the jury but 
should further consider the likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
on retrial or how the first trial might have progressed had the strategy 
not been skewed.260 
The false testimony cases provide a useful illustration.  Courts of-
ten adopt a backward-looking analysis to assess the impact of perjury 
and require the defendant to show that the jury would probably have 
reached a different verdict in the absence of the perjury.261  A varia-
 
detailed review of the evidence against the defendant); United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 
115, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (first stating the probable-acquittal standard but then restating 
the test in backward-looking language); Alvarez v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1094 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  CRIMINAL § 557 (2d ed. 1982)).; see also United States v. Leary, 378 F. Supp. 
2d 482, 493–94 (D. Del. 2005) (considering the likely impact of newly discovered im-
peachment evidence, the court pointed out that the witness in question had been im-
peached with other evidence at trial, leading the court to conclude that the evidence was 
cumulative and that it was not likely that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had the evidence been used at trial, and also addressing the question of whether the new 
evidence would probably produce an acquittal); United States v. Arroyo, 301 F. Supp. 2d 
217, 228–29 (D. Conn. 2004) (looking backward, stating that “[b]ut for” the misleading 
evidence, “the government probably would have been unable to meet its burden to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “[h]ad the jury known the truth . . . it would 
have had ‘a tremendous impact on the jury’s credibility assessment of the witness[es]’” 
and the jury would probably have acquitted). In the oral argument in Vasquez, the gov-
ernment argued that the Court should assess only the impact of the error on a reasonable 
or rational jury, whereas the defense argued that the Court should assess the impact of 
the error on the actual jury.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–29, Vasquez v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 1532 (2012) (No. 11-199). 
259 See United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 561 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he issue cannot be 
what the defense has already proved, but what the defense might reasonably be able to 
prove . . . .”); see also Field, supra note 150, at 47–54 (discussing ways in which error may 
have changed trial dynamic); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 990. 
260 Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 990; see United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 701 (7th Cir. 
2012) (mentioning the possible effect of the error on the defense strategy in deciding 
that the error was not harmless). 
261 See, e.g., United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that de-
fendant must show that jury would probably have acquitted had it not heard the perjured 
testimony, but concluding that the defendant did not), vacated, Mitrione v. United States, 
543 U.S. 1097 (2005); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2000) (ap-
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tion on the backward-looking test is to ask whether the jury would 
have convicted had the witness’s testimony been exposed as perjury.262  
Using this approach, the court would ask whether the jury would 
have viewed the case differently had they learned that a witness had 
lied to them under oath and that the government had knowingly al-
lowed the false testimony to stand.  It seems likely that this disclosure 
would discredit the entire case against the defendant. 
Other courts look forward, asking whether the new evidence 
would probably result in a more favorable verdict if the defendant 
won a new trial.263  Applying a forward-looking analysis, the court may 
focus on the way in which the defendant could use the new infor-
mation but, equally, may hypothesize the way in which the govern-
ment could successfully respond to the problem raised by the de-
fendant.264  For example, in United States v. Williams, the court 
concluded that in a new trial, the prosecution could avoid calling 
witnesses who committed perjury and obtain a conviction using other 
witnesses.265  This tack should be taken very cautiously, given the chal-
lenge of determining how the jury would react to evidence that was 
never offered at the first trial.266 
 
plying a backward-looking test and concluding “new evidence was unlikely to have altered 
the jury’s verdict”), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
262 See, e.g., Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that had the jury 
known of the witness’s perjury, it would have been unlikely to convict). 
263 See, e.g., United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 217–21 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing and 
adopting forward-looking standard, and concluding the new trial would result in convic-
tion); United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1532 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating forward-
looking test); United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying for-
ward-looking standard).  Rule 33 mandates a forward-looking inquiry. 
264 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of new 
trial in part because prosecution would not have to call a witness targeted by newly dis-
covered impeachment evidence at the retrial). 
265 233 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
266 See United States v. King, 232 F. Supp. 2d 636, 652 (E.D. Va. 2002).  The government 
sought to persuade the court to consider evidence that it had not used at the first trial but 
argued it could use on retrial of the case.  Rejecting this argument, the court described 
the challenge that approach would pose: 
It is difficult enough to assess the probability of acquittal when the witnesses have 
testified under the rules of evidence, when they have faced cross-examination, 
when the Court has the benefit of the jury’s verdict, and when the Court has heard 
the evidence and the witnesses, both at trial and in support of the motion.  Where 
the prosecution asks the Court to consider the effect of evidence that would have 
been offered, evidence that has not been tested by cross-examination or circum-
scribed by the rules of evidence, the exercise becomes one of sheer speculation.  
The Court declines to speculate on the basis of hearsay, double hearsay, and a 
modicum of uncross-examined firsthand knowledge and, thereupon, to surmise 
how a case of that configuration would come out without the testimony of [the 
discredited witnesses] or with that testimony but also with the testimony of [wit-
nesses who would testify to the plan to present false testimony] and the recanta-
tion of [one of the key witnesses]. 
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United States v. King, a trial court decision addressing the defend-
ant’s motion for a new trial after a prosecution witness recanted, illus-
trates the different paths of analysis that can be used.267   Taking a 
backward-looking approach, the District Court concluded that with-
out the false testimony, “the jury might well have reached a different 
conclusion . . . .”268   Weighing a different claim, the court applied 
forward-looking analysis and concluded that the new evidence would 
probably preclude the government from presenting several witnesses 
central to the case and that a new trial would not likely produce a 
conviction.269  The court also noted that even if the now-discredited 
witnesses testified at a new trial, the defense would be able to use the 
evidence now available to impeach them, again making conviction 
unlikely.270 
4. Accord More Weight to Signals Sent By the Jury 
Courts should scrutinize the jury’s actual conduct in the case for 
indications of harm.  They should consider factors such as the length 
of deliberations, any jury requests or questions, and whether the ver-
dict included a partial acquittal or the inability to reach a verdict on 
some charges.271  Such factors may not always be present but, when 
they are, they provide unusual insight into the harmfulness of a spe-
cific error.272 
 
  Id. 
267 Id. at 645; see also United States v. Jones, 84 F. Supp. 2d 124, 126–27 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(granting new trial based on assessment of what would have happened had information 
that prosecution expert lied about his credentials been discovered before defendant’s tri-
al and predicting what would happen in new trial); United States v. Brodwin, 292 F. Supp. 
2d 484, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (examining how the new evidence fit the prosecution’s theo-
ry of the case and interacted with the evidence presented at the initial trial and holding 
that defendant was entitled to a new trial because the new evidence “would very likely re-
quire the exclusion of important evidence admitted at trial and because it would require 
the Government to change the theory of prosecution it presented to the jury”); United 
States v. Alvarez, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1095–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (scrutinizing the evidence 
admitted against the defendant at the first trial, but also surmising that “[a]t a second tri-
al skilled counsel could use the new evidence to dramatic effect,” and describing how the 
evidence could play in a new trial). 
268 King, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
269 Id. at 650. 
270 Id. at 651. 
271 See Solomon, supra note 8, at 1095–97.  In the oral argument of Vasquez, the government 
argued that the Court should not consider indications that the jury struggled with the 
case.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–37, Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532 
(2012) (No. 11-199). 
272 But see Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 128 (arguing that courts do not have good in-
formation concerning what influenced jury). 
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In some cases, courts have viewed jury behavior as signaling 
harm.273  For example, if the jury failed to reach a verdict on some 
counts, requested further instruction, or requested re-reading of any 
evidence, the appellate court may be able to draw a fair inference as 
to what the jury regarded as important in the case.274 
However, even when the jury sends clear signals, courts do not al-
ways consider those signals in their assessment of harm.275  For exam-
ple, in Gonzalez-Rodriguez, the court concluded that the defendant had 
not shown that the plain error affected his substantial rights, even 
though the first jury failed to return a unanimous verdict, and the ju-
ry in the second trial, in which the government relied on improperly 
admitted evidence, convicted.276  The sequence signaled both that the 
case was close and that the erroneously admitted evidence played a 
key role.  Whenever the jury returns a split verdict, the courts should 
read it as a sign that the jury would have responded positively to a 
stronger showing by the defense, not that the jurors carefully parsed 
the testimony. 
 
273 See, e.g., United States v. Wisecarver, 598 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying reasona-
ble probability test and concluding that the erroneous supplemental jury instruction was 
plain error because the case was close, the instruction was supplemental, and the jury’s 
split verdict was consistent with application of the erroneous instruction); United States v. 
Garner, 507 F.3d 399, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that jury question signaled im-
portance of non-disclosed evidence); United States v. Russell, 221 F.3d 615, 623 (4th Cir. 
2000) (relying in part on jury questions in concluding, over dissent, that defendant was 
prejudiced); United States v. Alvarez, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (remarking 
that the jury deliberated ten hours, asked to have all the testimony related to the defend-
ant read back to them, and obtained a number of additional instructions from the court); 
King, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (considering fact that jury acquitted the defendant on some 
charges).  But see United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1221 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the 
jury asked to have some testimony re-read but did not focus on the objectionable evi-
dence and that the jury reached a verdict of guilty on all counts in less than a day; there-
fore finding the error harmless). 
274 See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 712, 715 (2d Cir. 1990) (reaching con-
clusion that error was harmful and noting that first trial had ended in a hung jury). 
275 See e.g., United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362–63 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing the jury’s acquittal of the defendant 
on two counts as factor supporting conclusion that error was harmless); United States v. 
Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (discounting the fact that the jury hung in the 
first trial as an indication that the evidence against the defendant was weak); United 
States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1437–38 (10th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Brady claim even 
though first trial ended in hung jury).  In Ford, the panel of judges divided over whether 
the withheld evidence was material, and only the dissenting judge attributed significance 
to the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of two charges.  550 F.3d at 994. 
276 United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
change in outcome could have been due to the admissible portions of the agent’s testi-
mony as well as the difference in the jurors). 
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5. Recognize that Jurors May React More Strongly than Judges to Certain 
Evidence 
Judges may ascribe different weight than lay jurors to the same ev-
idence.277  Jurors relate to each side of the case as a narrative story ra-
ther than an assembly of items of evidence, which affects the way er-
ror impacts their understanding of the case.278  Stories carry strong 
inferential power such that only a small number of facts are needed 
for jurors to develop a story around the evidence.279  Moreover, jurors 
assess the strength of the stories told at trial by determining if the sto-
ries match their particular understandings of society.280 
Judges, on the other hand, rely on their own perspective and ex-
perience to determine the strength of the case against the defend-
ant.281  Because of their experience and training, judges may dismiss 
evidence as cumulative, concluding it had or would have had limited 
impact, whereas jurors actually attach significant weight to redundant 
evidence.282  Judges naturally base their assessment of harm on their 
reaction to the error, and may therefore inaccurately assess the im-
pact of error on the jury.283  Instead of assuming that their assessment 
of the evidence represents the jury’s view, judges should recognize 
that evidence may affect jurors in a way that it does not affect the 
court.284 
 
277 See Teitelbaum, et al., supra note 8, at 1184–85 (noting differences between law-trained 
and lay assessments of harm). 
278 See Solomon, supra note 8, at 1089–90; see also W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM:  JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE ix (1981) (discussing  the importance of storytelling in the courtroom); W. 
Lance Bennett, Storytelling in Criminal Trials:  A Model of Social Judgment, 64 Q. J. OF SPEECH 
1, 1–3 (1978) (discussing how stories help jurors organize evidence); Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Patriarchal Stories I:  Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUDIES 
387, 434–37 (1996) (discussing importance of narrative). 
279 See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 278, at 4. 
280 See Id., at 68 (noting that jurors are not completely objective in their credibility assess-
ments because jurors may be influenced by well-constructed stories that lack strong evi-
dentiary support). 
281 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 53, at 131. 
282 Solomon, supra note 8, at 1091–92; see REID HASTIE, ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 163–64 
(1983) (observing two models of evidence assessment).  The authors observed an “evi-
dence-driven” style of jury deliberation, marked by jurors reviewing the evidence in an at-
tempt to “agree upon the most credible story.”  The authors also observed a “verdict-
driven” style of deliberation, marked by jurors choosing a single verdict and citing all the 
evidence in support of that verdict.  Id. 
283 See Teitelbaum, et al., supra note 8, at 1154 (reporting results of comparison of law-
trained and lay assessments of harm). 
284 See Anderson, supra note 52, at 401 (noting that judges dismiss as harmless error the 
presentation of evidence that may strongly affect the jurors).  Judges should also recog-
nize the tendency to understate the prejudicial impact of evidence on the defendant.  See 
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For example, evidence that a court views as “merely cumulative or 
impeaching” may round out the defendant’s case and persuade the 
jurors.285  Either the omission or the inclusion of information will im-
pact the coherence and persuasiveness of the narrative.286 
United States v. Russell illustrates the different approaches to inter-
preting jury conduct taken by different judges.287  In Russell, the de-
fendant, a prisoner, claimed prejudice based on the erroneous ad-
mission of two prior convictions, in addition to the conviction for 
which he was incarcerated.  The majority concluded that the defend-
ant had suffered prejudice, based in part upon the questions from 
the jury.288  However, the third member of the panel disagreed, con-
cluding that the improperly admitted convictions did not have the 
required negative impact and positing a different explanation for the 
questions.289  The majority approach, more receptive to the possibility 
that jurors would be prejudiced by the improper evidence, provides 
more appropriate protection to the defendant.290 
6. Limit the degree of deference to the trial court 
Both new trial motions and plain error determinations are discre-
tionary and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of discretion.  The 
standard of review for the other claims should be made clear,291 and 
 
Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Crim-
inal Cases:  An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 349, 385–90 (2006) (reporting prejudicial 
impact of joinder of charges permitted by courts and suggesting that courts may underes-
timate prejudicial effect of joinder or overestimate effectiveness of limiting instructions). 
285 In Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 148 (1st Cir. 2003), the court recognized 
“the impeaching power of a witness’s evolving story” but nevertheless rejected the de-
fendant’s claim.  See also United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 350–351 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that agent’s improper overview evidence, presented before the evidence in the 
case, was harmless because it was supported by other evidence); HASTIE, ET AL., supra note 
282, at 163–64 (observing that “verdict-driven juries” choose a single verdict and list all 
the evidence that supports that verdict); Field, supra note 149, at 37 (criticizing cumula-
tive evidence approach to harmless error analysis); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Ex-
plaining the Evidence:  Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189–91 (1992) (noting that jurors will more readily accept the story 
that has the greatest coverage, coherence, and uniqueness). 
286 See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 278, 88–90 (finding that jurors view more ambiguous 
stories as less plausible and noting that only a small number of facts are needed for jurors 
to draw inferences and construct stories); Pennington & Hastie, supra note 285, at 189–91 
(explaining that stories’ coverage, coherence, and uniqueness affect jurors’ decisions). 
287 221 F.3d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 2000). 
288 Id. at 623.  
289 Id. at 625 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
290 Russell, 221 F.3d at 617. 
291 For example, not all courts agree on the standard of review for questions of materiality.  
Compare United States v. Pettiford, 627 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that re-
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more claims should be reviewed de novo,292 rather than for abuse of 
discretion.293  The protections at stake are so important that the 
claims warrant a second close look. 
One customary reason for deference, advanced in some of the 
harm assessment cases, is that the trial court is better positioned to 
assess the actual impact of the proceedings on the jury and the credi-
bility of the witnesses.294  Thus, if the issue turns on the credibility of 
witnesses or specific trial dynamics, the appellate court will generally 
defer to the trial court.  However, once the defendant has been con-
victed, the presiding judge is likely to suffer from the types of bias 
discussed above, which will predispose the judge to believe the prose-
cution witnesses were accurate and largely truthful and to approach 
defense claims with skepticism.  Unlike a typical question of fact re-
 
view of materiality is de novo), with United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 300 (6th Cir. 
2010) (denial of motion for new trial based on violation of Brady reviewed for abuse of 
discretion) (quoting United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
292 See Pettiford, 627 F.3d at 1227 (stating that review of materiality is de novo); United States 
v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that Brady claims are de novo but that 
“due deference” must be accorded to the trial court); United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 
382, 387 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that review of Brady and Giglio claims is de novo); United 
States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting disagreement about standard 
of review that applies to Brady questions); United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 
(10th Cir. 1989) (stating that review is de novo); see also United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 
581, 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that review of Brady claim is de novo, but fact findings 
are accorded deference and determination of materiality made after in camera review is 
reviewed only of clear error). 
293 See United States v. Tate, 633 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the stating for 
review is for abuse of discretion); United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 
2011) (standard of review of ruling denying Rule 33 motion for new trial is abuse of dis-
cretion); Warshak, 631 F.3d at 300 (stating that the denial of motion for new trial based 
on violation of Brady is reviewed for abuse of discretion) (quoting Graham, 484 F.3d at 
416); United States v. Baker, 453 F.3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating standard as abuse 
of discretion); see also United States v. Holder, 657 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that review of decision concerning whether there was a Brady violation is de novo, but re-
view of denial of new trial on that ground is for abuse of discretion). 
294 See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 375 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing trial court’s op-
portunity to assess the role of the evidence and deferring to trial court ); Miller, 520 F.3d 
at 514 (stating that the appellate court has “an inherent disadvantage” because it reviews 
a cold record and that “due deference” must therefore be accorded to the trial court); 
Sipe, 388 F.3d at 479 (discussing trial court’s advantage); United States v. Mitchell, 365 
F.3d 215, 257 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that “the District Court had the best vantage point”); 
Dumas, 207 F.3d at 16 (noting “the district court’s superior position from which to assess 
the new evidence”); Edwards, supra note 13, at 1193.  In United States v. Gambino, the Se-
cond Circuit stated: 
The trial court has “broad discretion” to decide Rule 33 motions based upon its 
evaluation of the proof produced, and its ruling is deferred to on appeal because, 
having presided over the trial, it is in a better position to decide what effect the 
newly discovered materials might have had on the jury. 
  59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
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solved on the evidence where the judge does not have a stake in the 
result, harm assessments require the judge to gauge the impact of an 
error she herself permitted and to possibly undertake a retrial of the 
case.295  For that reason, the customary deference should not be ac-
corded a self-serving determination of lack of harm. 
Recognizing the pressures on the trial court to justify the outcome 
of the trial and find no harm, appellate courts should defer only if 
the trial court ruling is counter to those pressures.  If the trial court’s 
ruling favors the defendant, it may be accorded deference.296  A pro-
defendant finding signals that the trial court did not succumb to the 
pressures to allow the verdict to stand; there is less reason to fear that 
factors such as hindsight bias have influenced the trial court.  Other-
wise, deference should be limited; the reviewing court should exam-
ine carefully the trial court’s determination that the defendant was 
not harmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Better guidance in defining and applying the harm-assessing tests 
is critical to assuring that an accused defendant receives a fair trial 
and to enforcing the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Current-
ly, the tests ask courts to draw impossibly fine distinctions, and courts 
fail to adhere to consistent definitions of the tests.  The resulting lack 
of clarity, in addition to the pressure to affirm convictions and the 
psychological forces that weigh on the side of affirming convictions, 
poses the danger that errors that contributed to convictions will go 
uncorrected.  Moreover, because of the blending in application of 
the harm assessing tests, courts fail to provide greater protection 
when the defendant shows a violation that is said to warrant more 
protection, and the burden on the defendant to prove harm may 
tend to increase. 
 
295 See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts:  The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and 
Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1331–33 (2004) (arguing for 
more robust appellate review). 
296 See, e.g., White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005) (deferring to trial court’s find-
ing of prejudice and not independently reviewing the evidence); Sipe, 388 F.3d at 478–79 
(deferring to the trial court’s assessment that the evidence withheld was material).  But see 
Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 194 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the trial court’s conclusions, which resulted in a finding of materiality, were not 
entitled to deference); United States v. Hughes, 230 F.3d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 2000) (revers-
ing grant of new proceeding even though both the Magistrate Judge and the District 
Court Judge had held evidentiary hearing and concluded that non-disclosed evidence was 
material); Mitchell, supra note 55, 1353–57 (arguing that appellate courts should defer to 
trial courts on questions of harmless error). 
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Thus, the courts must provide better guidance in the definition 
and application of these harm-assessing tests.  First, courts should re-
duce the number of tests and the reliance on small distinctions in 
language.  The differentiations on which courts have relied involve 
distinctions too fine to be meaningful.  Second, courts should clearly 
allocate and define the burden of proof.  Third, courts should em-
phasize that the mere sufficiency of the evidence should not lead a 
court to reject a claim of harm.  Finally, courts should prescribe an 
approach to applying the tests.  Such an approach should accord 
more weight to signals sent by the jury and look more closely at the 
role of the error in the trial.  Moreover, the evidence should be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.  Courts should 
also attempt to consider the likely outcome of an error-free trial in 
addition to determining the impact of the error at the time of the ini-
tial trial.  Finally, the prescribed approach should recognize that ju-
rors and judges may react differently to certain evidence.  By better 
defining and applying these harm assessing tests, the courts will 
achieve both clarity and functionality that will better enforce protect-
ed rights across the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
